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DERICK R. DEEBEN, 
Defendant/Respondent 
Case No. 880104-CA 
P r i o r i t y C l a s s i f i c a t i o n 14b 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
J u r i s d i c t i o n t o h e a r t h i s a p p e a l i s c o n f e r r e d upon t h i s 
Cour t p u r s u a n t t o S e c t i o n 7 8 - 2 a - 3 ( 2 ) ( h ) , Utah Code A n n o t a t e d , a s 
amended, g r a n t i n g t o t h e Cour t of Appea l s a p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n 
over a p p e a l s from d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n v o l v i n g d o m e s t i c r e l a t i o n s 
c a s e s , i n c l u d i n g bu t no t l i m i t e d t o d i v o r c e , c h i l d c u s t o d y , 
s u p p o r t and v i s i t a t i o n . 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
T h i s a p p e a l i s t a k e n from a Judgment and Decree of 
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Divorce granted on January 20, 1988 granting custody of the two 
minor children to each of the pa r t i e s with the defendant having 
primary care for the minor child f Heather Lyn Deeben and 
p l a in t i f f having primary care for the minor child f Kevin Roy 
Deeben. The t r i a l court also made an order regarding v i s i t a t i o n 
with the minor chi ldren. On January 29, 1988f an Order was 
entered by Judge Douglas L. Cornaby denying p l a i n t i f f ' s Motion 
for Stay of Judgment as t o the custody of the minor chi ld , 
Heather Lyn Deeben. The t r i a l court amended the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law by inclusion of a complete t r ansc r ip t 
of the t r i a l cou r t ' s bench ruling of November 13, 1987. 
P l a i n t i f f ' s Notice of Appeal was f i l ed on February 16, 1988 with 
the Dis t r i c t Court of Davis County, State of Utah. 
On April 26, 1988, the Court of Appeals denied 
p l a i n t i f f ' s Motion for Summary Disposition on the basis of 
manifest error but remanded the case to the t r i a l court to 
amend the findings of fact to re f lec t the c o u r t ' s determination 
of the "best i n t e r e s t s of the chi ld" . 
On November 2, 1988, the t r i a l court made Additional 
Findings of Fact and adopted Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law submitted by defendant. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
-2-
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awarding primary phys ica l ca re of the minor c h i l d , Heather Lyn 
Deebenf t o defendant? 
2 . Did t h e t r i a l cour t abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n in not 
fo l lowing t h e general r u l e of l eav ing a ch i l d where she was 
l i v i n g as long as she was happy and w e l l - a d j u s t e d without a 
f ind ing s t a t i n g a s u b s t a n t i a l reason t o change custody? 
3 . Are the Findings of Fact adopted by the Court 
i n s u f f i c i e n t t o support t he award of custody of Heather Lyn 
Deeben t o defendant? 
4 . Did t h e t r i a l cour t r u l e in a p r e j u d i c i a l manner 
toward p l a i n t i f f a f t e r she f a i l e d t o accept t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s 
recommendation as t o j o i n t custody? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Sect ion 30-3-5(1) Utah Code Annotated, as amended, 
(Dispos i t ion of p roper ty -cus tody and v i s i t a t i o n ) 
30-3-5(1) When a decree of divorce i s 
rendered , the Court may include in 
i t e q u i t a b l e o rders r e l a t i n g t o t h e 
c h i l d r e n , p rope r ty , and p a r t i e s . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1 . Nature of the Case. This i s a divorce proceeding; 
- 3 -
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t r i a l was held before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby in the 
Second Judic ia l D i s t r i c t Court of Davis County. The Decree of 
Divorce was entered on January 20, 1988. Additional Findings of 
Fact were made and adopted by the t r i a l court on November 2, 
1988. P la in t i f f appeals the custody award of the child f Heather 
Lyn Deeben, to defendant. 
2 . Course of the Proceedings. The p l a in t i f f f i led a 
Complaint for divorce on January 12, 1987. Defendant was served 
and f i l ed an Answer on May 26, 1987. P la in t i f f f i led a Reply 
to defendant 's Counterclaim on June 3 , 1987. Defendant f i l ed a 
Request for P r e - t r i a l on July 14, 1987. An Order was entered 
July 29, 1987 granting to p l a in t i f f temporary custody of the 
chi ldren, subject to defendant 's v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s . P r e - t r i a l 
was held on August 12, 1987 before Domestic Relations 
Commissioner, Maurice Richards. 
Issues reserved for t r i a l were custody, v i s i t a t i o n , 
divis ion of personal property, alimony and attorney fees. The 
Domestic Relations Commissioner recommended tha t defendant 's 
parents be granted v i s i t a t i o n from Friday evening a t 6:00 p.m. to 
Sunday evening a t 6:00 p.m. with the chi ld, Heather Lyn Deeben, 
during the time defendant was in the U.S. Army stat ioned at Ft. 
Hood, Texas. P la in t i f f f i l ed an Objection to the Domestic 
Relations Commissioner's Recommended Order as i t re la ted to 
- 4 -
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g r a n d p a r e n t ' s v i s i t a t i o n . P l a i n t i f f reques ted d e f e n d a n t ' s 
p a r e n t s be granted one weekend per month v i s i t a t i o n with Heather 
Lyn. 
On September 8, 1987, p l a i n t i f f ' s Object ion t o 
Commissioner 's Recommendation came on for hear ing before Judge 
Douglas L. Cornaby. Defendant appeared in person on September 8 f 
1987 having obta ined a hardsh ip d ischarge from the U.S. Army. 
Defendant was granted v i s i t a t i o n with Heather every o ther 
weekend upon s t i p u l a t i o n and agreement of t he p a r t i e s inasmuch 
as he was then discharged from the Army and l i v i n g in Salem, 
Utah. A home study eva lua t ion was ordered a t t he reques t of 
defendant . 
A home study and custody eva lua t i on was conducted by 
Steven L. Watson, r e t a i n e d by defendant . Mr Watson recommended 
t h e best i n t e r e s t s of the c h i l d r e n would be served by having 
t h e i r custody awarded t o p l a i n t i f f , J a n e t t e Deeben. The home 
study and custody eva lua t ion was completed on November 1 1 , 1987 
and submit ted t o t he Court . 
The mat te r was t r i e d on November 1 3 , 1987 before the 
Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby. The t r i a l cour t found each of the 
p a r t i e s f i t and proper persons t o have custody of the c h i l d r e n 
and awarded j o i n t custody of the minor c h i l d r e n t o each of the 
p a r t i e s . Defendant was t o have primary ca re of the c h i l d , 
Heather Lyn Deeben, and p l a i n t i f f primary care of the c h i l d , 
- 5 -
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Kevin Roy Deeben. 
3. Disposition at Trial Court, The Decree of Divorce 
was entered on January 20, 1988 awarding joint custody of both 
children to the parties with plaintiff to have physical custody 
of Kevin Roy Deeben and defendant to have physical custody of 
Heather Lyn Deeben. The trial court supplemented and amended its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on January 19, 1988 by 
appending the transcript of the Bench Ruling of November 13, 1987 
and incorporating the same as its findings. The trial court 
adopted defendant's proposed Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on November 2, 1988 and made additional 
Findings of Fact on November 2f 1988. 
4. Statement of Revelant Facts. The parties were 
married on September 6, 1984 in Sunset, Davis County, Utah 
(Tr., at 4). Their first child, Heather Lyn Deeben, was born on 
March 1, 1985 (Tr., at 4). Plaintiff had attend Utah State 
University and Weber State College prior to her marriage to 
defendant (Tr., at 5). Plaintiff was a sophomore enrolled at 
Weber State College majoring in elementary education at the time 
of trial (Tr. , at 5). 
Plaintiff was residing at home with her mother and 
father and had been since last separating from defendant in 
January, 1987 (Tr., at 6). Plaintiff's mother and her two 
sisters assisted plaintiff with child care responsibilities when 
-6-
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she was a t school or working (Tr. , at 15) . P la in t i f f was 
pregnant a t the time the pa r t i e s married and no one in e i ther 
family wanted t h i s marriage to occur (Home study at 5 ) . 
Defendant threatened to have the marriage annulled two months 
after the i r marriage (Tr. , at 15) . In February, 1985
 f six 
months af ter marriage, p l a in t i f f was examined for a possible 
miscarriage after a physical fight with defendant (Tr. , at 15) . 
Heather Lyn Deeben was born on March 1, 1985 (Tr. , a t 
5 ) . In December, 1985 defendant threatened to divorce p la in t i f f 
and take Heather away from her (Tr. , at 16) . P la in t i f f 
threatened to use a knife on herself during t h i s argument if he 
took her child away (Tr. , at 16) . The police were called to 
t h e i r apartment during the disturbance (Tr. , a t 81) . 
The pa r t i e s separated a month l a t e r in January, 1986 
when defendant joined the U.S. Army (Tr. , at 16, 17) . P la in t i f f 
maintained an apartment in Roy, Weber County, Utah with her 
daughter, Heather Lyn Deeben, while defendant was stat ioned in 
New Jersey for basic t r a in ing (Tr. , a t 16, 17) . After 
completion of basic t r a in ing , p l a in t i f f joined defendant in July, 
1986 while stat ioned a t Ft. Hood, Texas. 
While in Texas, the pa r t i e s had severe arguments, some 
leading to physical confrontations (Tr. , at 18) . In August, 
1986, p l a i n t i f f ' s l e f t arm was placed in a semi-cast and s l ing 
af ter blocking a blow to her face (Tr. , at 18) . 
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The pa r t i e s separated af ter an argument in October, 
1986 and p l a in t i f f returned to Utah (Tr. f at 19) . Heather Lyn 
remained in the care of p l a in t i f f during t h i s separation (Tr. , 
a t 19) . There was discussion of divorce a t t h i s time (Tr. , at 
19) . P la in t i f f , however returned and joined defendant in Texas 
around November 11 , 1986 (Tr. f at 19) . The pa r t i e s did not 
not speak to each other for a week (Tr. , at 20) . 
On November 24, 1986, defendant slapped p l a i n t i f f in 
the face after an argument (Tr. , at 20) . P la in t i f f sought 
medical treatment a t the emergency room of the Ft. Hood mi l i ta ry 
hospital ( P l a i n t i f f ' s Exhibit 1 ) . The medical report indica tes 
mild, facial contusion with chief complaints being to her eye and 
ear ( P l a i n t i f f ' s Exhibit 1 ) . P la in t i f f to ld the t r ea t i ng 
physician she would contact the "Family in Cr i s i s" organization 
( P l a i n t i f f ' s Exhibit 1 ) . 
The pa r t i e s had another severe argument on or about 
January 7, 1987 resul t ing in the police being cal led to the home 
(Tr. f at 21) . P la in t i f f stayed with a neighbor tha t night and 
returned to Utah the next day, on January 8, 1987 with Heather 
Lyn. P la in t i f f f i led for divorce on January 12, 1987. 
Defendant remained in Texas un t i l March, 1987 when he 
came home on leave (Tr. , at 22) . Defendant had v i s i t a t i o n with 
his daughter for about one week while on leave (Tr. , at 23) . 
Defendant's parents had v i s i t a t i o n with Heather Lyn about one 
- 8 -
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weekend per month a f t e r p l a i n t i f f re tu rned t o Utah in January , 
1987 ( T r . , a t 23) . 
P l a i n t i f f gave b i r t h to her second c h i l d f Kevin Roy 
Deeben, on Ju ly 1 , 1987 ( T r . , a t 2 3 ) . Defendant claimed Kevin 
was not h i s c h i l d and t h a t p l a i n t i f f must have been raped (T r . , 
a t 4 3 ) . Defendant r e tu rned t o Utah in t h e l a t t e r p a r t of J u l y , 
1987 a f t e r the b i r t h of Kevin, and was allowed v i s i t a t i o n with 
Heather and t o see Kevin ( T r . , a t 2 4 ) . 
Defendant obta ined a hardsh ip d ischarge from the Army 
around t h e f i r s t of September, 1987 ( T r . , a t 92 , 9 3 ) . At t r i a l 
defendant claims t h e reason for t he ha rdsh ip d ischarge was h i s 
u n i t was being ass igned t o Germany and he would be unable t o see 
a f t e r the ca re of h i s c h i l d r e n and f i n a l i z e h i s divorce (T r . , a t 
9 3 ) . So defendant choose t o take a hardsh ip d ischarge r a t h e r 
than go t o Europe (T r . , a t 9 3 ) . 
However, d e f e n d a n t ' s counsel and defendant made o ther 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s a t a hear ing before Judge Cornaby on September 8 , 
1987. (Hearing, September 8, 1987) . 
P l a i n t i f f had objec ted t o t h e P r e - t r i a l Recommendation 
of v i s i t a t i o n every o ther weekend for de f endan t ' s p a r e n t s . 
(Objection t o Commissioner's Recommendation). Hearing on t h e 
ob j ec t i on came before Judge Douglas L. Cornaby on September 8, 
1987. The i s sue of g r a n d p a r e n t ' s v i s i t a t i o n became moot as 
defendant was discharged from the m i l i t a r y and had re tu rned t o 
- 9 -
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Utah by September 8, 1987. However, as to the issue of child 
support, defendant 's counsel argued tha t defendant should pay 
very l i t t l e if any child support as defendant now had no income 
as a resu l t of recently being discharged from the Army. (Hearing, 
September 8, 1987, at 8, 9 ) . Defendant and h is counsel repre-
sented he was injured in Army f ie ld exercises and needed surgery 
(Hearing Sept. 8, 1987, at 8, 9 ) . Defendant had been released 
to the Veteran 's Administration and h is f i r s t appointment was 
within approximately two weeks (Hearing Sept. 8, 1987, at 9 ) . 
The reason he l e f t the mi l i ta ry was due to a 50/50 probabi l i ty 
of permanent knee impairment af ter surgery (Hearing Sept. 8, 
1987, at 9 ) . Defendant was ordered to pay $80.00 per month per 
child by the court . (Hearing Sept. 8, 1987, at 10) . 
After the hearing of September 8, 1987 p l a in t i f f f i l ed 
a Request for Production of Documents to obtain a copy of 
Defendant's Hardship Discharge papers and re la ted correspondence. 
None were produced. P la in t i f f f i l ed a Motion to Compel Discovery 
on October 30, 1987. S t i l l Defendant did not produce a copy of 
the discharge or correspondence. At the time of t r i a l 
p l a i n t i f f ' s counsel alleged surprise when defendant t e s t i f i e d he 
obtained a hardship discharge to resolve the divorce and custody 
issue because of the representat ions made by defendant and his 
counsel at the Hearing of September 8, 1987. ( T r . , a t . 99, 100). 
A psychologist , Steven L. Watson, choosen and retained 
-10-
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by defendant conducted a home study and custody eva lua t i on 
(Home Study and Custody E v a l u a t i o n ) . Mr. Watson recommended t h e 
bes t i n t e r e s t s of t he c h i l d r e n would be served by having t h e i r 
care and custody awarded t o t he p l a i n t i f f (Home s tudy, a t 7 ) . 
Mr. Watson p r ed i c t ed t h a t p l a i n t i f f would do more a c t u a l 
pa r en t i ng than would defendant due t o h i s work and school 
schedules (Home study f a t 6 ) . Defendant was employed a t Best 
Produc ts , Provo, Utah working 20 t o 30 hours per week a t $3.40 
per hour. Defendant planned t o a t t e n d Utah Community College 
next term and work p a r t time in a d d i t i o n (T r . , a t 90 and Home 
Study, a t 3 ) . Defendant was placed in t he Reserves as p a r t of 
h i s ha rdsh ip d ischarge which c a r r i e s with i t a t t e n d a n t weekend 
d r i l l s (T r . , a t 9 9 ) . 
Mr. Watson a l s o p r ed i c t ed t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s s i t u a t i o n 
would r e q u i r e cons ide rab le use of b a b y s i t t e r ' s dur ing day t imes 
because de f endan t ' s p a r e n t ' s work and h i s o ther b r o t h e r ' s and 
s i s t e r ' s would be in school (Home s tudy, a t 6 ) . While 
p l a i n t i f f ' s s i t u a t i o n i s s i m i l a r , use of b a b y s i t t e r s i s not 
necessary as o f ten (Home s tudy, a t 6 ) . Only one of t h r e e 
r e f e rences of defendant could say they had seen defendant with 
Heather on more than one or two occas ions (Home Study, a t 5 ) . 
Heather Lyn appeared t o be a b r i g h t and a c t i v e ch i l d t o Mr. 
Watson (Home s tudy, a t 4 ) . She was judged t o be q u i t e well 
developed both menta l ly and p h y s i c a l l y (Home s tudy, a t 4 ) . Her 
- 1 1 -
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vocabulary was a bit ahead of most children her age (Home study, 
at 4). There was no indication the child was not healthy, happy, 
and well adjusted at the time of trial. 
The trial judge meet with counsel for the parties for 
approximately one hour and fifteen minutes prior to trial in an 
effort to settle the case (Tr., at 2). The trial judge 
suggested joint custody with plaintiff, Janette Deeben, being 
awarded actual physical custody of both children but defendant to 
have Heather Lyn one week (seven days) per month continuous 
visitation until she started school. Defendant to have 
visitation four hours per week with Kevin until he became 
somewhat older. The case went to trial as plaintiff resisted 
joint custody preferring custody of the children to herself with 
defendant to have visitation every other weekend. 
At the start of the trial, the trial judge stated, 
Now, as we start, one of the 
original issues in the matter was 
custody and because of what I said 
in chambers and recommended to the 
parties in chambers, I want the 
parties to understand that I have no 
preconceived notions as I start this 
hearing that the plaintiff is going 
to get custody of the children. I 
want them to understand that so that 
if, at the end of the hearing, I 
think it's appropriate that the 
defendant be awarded the custody, 
you don't misinterpret when I try to 
get something solved in my chambers, 
so you both understand that (Tr., 
at 2) . 
-12-
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At the conclusion of the t r i a l the Court found tha t 
each of the pa r t i e s are f i t and proper persons to have the care f 
custody and control of the minor children and the Court finds 
t h a t each of the pa r t i e s should be awarded jo in t custody of the 
two minor children, with the defendant having primary care for 
the minor chi ld, Heather and the p l a in t i f f having primary care 
for the minor chi ld , Kevin (Amended Findings of Fact #7). 
The Court made a finding tha t defendant chose the 
hardship discharge so tha t he could f ight for custody of his 
children (Trial Court 's Additional Findings of Fact #1, at 2 ) . 
The Court fa i led to make a finding tha t defendant wanted to get 
out of the service because of an alleged physical injury. 
The t r i a l court made a finding tha t p l a in t i f f has been 
the primary caretaker the majority of the time un t i l the Court 's 
rul ing on January 19, 1988 (Additional Findings of Fact #2, at 
2 ) . The Court found t h i s was out of necessity because of the 
defendant 's mi l i tary assignment during 1987 (Additional Findings 
of Fact #2, at 2 ) . The Court found the defendant spent as much 
time as caretaker of Heather as the p l a in t i f f when he was in 
the home and not f i l l i n g mi l i ta ry dut ies (Additional Findings of 
Fact #2, at 3 ) . 
The Court found p l a in t i f f gave Heather paregoric when 
i t was not medically necessary and neared the point of being 
habit forming (Additional Findings of Fact #3, at 3 ) . 
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The Court found p l a in t i f f had been a be t ter custodial 
parent since returning to Utah where she had ass is tance of her 
family (Additional Findings of Fact #4, at 3)• 
The Court found there i s no special need created by 
any bond between Heather and Kevinf there being no pa r t i cu la r 
attachment by the s i s t e r to the new born brother at t h i s time 
(Amended Findings of Fact #7 E). The t r i a l court s ta ted the 
bonding i s not the same as with children when they are older , 
when they became bet ter acquainted, when they have been long 
associated with each other, and he was not even so sure the 
bonding became so strong tha t e i ther party should be denied a 
r igh t to have custody just so tha t one parent can be sa t i s f i ed 
with t o t a l custody or no custody (Tr. , at 148, 149). 
However, defendant s ta ted he considered i t extremely 
important in a c h i l d ' s growth and development tha t the two 
children be together (Tr. , at 112, 113). P la in t i f f t e s t i f i e d 
the two children in teracted a lo t with Heather playing the role of 
mother to Kevin (Tr. , at 57) . 
The t r i a l court ruled tha t i t would refuse to follow 
the general rule of leaving the children where they have been 
unless t h e r e ' s some major reason for changing them (Tr. , at 
154) . The court s ta ted , 
If we followed tha t in t h i s kind of 
a case, we would never consider the 
person who i s in the mi l i ta ry 
• -14-
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service for custody because they are 
always subject to a change in duty 
and that like the defendant, husband 
there was no way that the family 
could be together. So, there is a 
special consideration that must be 
given to these military circumstance 
that would not be there if both 
parties were in the State of Utah 
(Tr., at 154) . 
SUMMARY OP THE ARGUMENT 
1. That the trial court abused it's discretion in awarding 
primary physical care of the minor child, Heather Lyn Deeben, to 
defendant. That plaintiff was unquestionably the primary 
caretaker of the child during the course of the marriage. The 
child was healthy, happy and well adjusted in her present 
environment. Plaintiff has the greater flexibility to provide 
personal care for the child. Heather has spent all of her life 
with plaintiff and was closer to her than the defendant. The 
award of custody of Heather to defendant created a split custody 
award as Kevin Roy Deeben should unquestionably remain with 
plaintiff. That as to other factors relative to the parties 
character or capacity to function as parents each party ranks 
equally. The Home Study and Custody Evaluation found the best 
interests of the children were served by the award of their 
custody and care to plaintiff. 
2. The trial court abused its discretion in not 
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following the general rule of leaving a child when she has been 
l iv ing as long as she was happy and well adjusted as i t did not 
find or express a substant ia l reason for changing custody. The 
t r i a l court admitted there was no major reason for changing 
custody but refused to follow the law i s t h i s case due to 
defendant 's mi l i tary circumstances. The t r i a l court can not 
change the fac t s of t h i s case to su i t i t s e l f . Allegations of 
diaper rash and unwarranted administrat ion of paragoric to 
Heather Lyn Deeben are disputed and ins igni f icant f ac to r s . 
3 . The Findings of Fact adopted by the Court are 
insuf f ic ien t to support the award of custody of Heather Lyn 
Deeben to defendant. The findings of the t r i a l court do not 
support a s ign i f i c i en t or major reason for taking Heather Lyn 
Deeben out of her mother fs home. If p l a in t i f f i s a good enough 
parent to be awarded the custody of her sonf Kevin Roy Deebenf 
she i s also a good enough parent to be awarded custody of 
Heather. The Court does not s t a t e any substant ia l reason for 
s p l i t t i n g the chi ldren. 
4 . The t r i a l court ruled in a prejudical manner 
toward p l a in t i f f after she fa i led to accept the t r i a l cou r t ' s 
recommendation of jo in t custody. The t r i a l court was apparently 
angered by p l a i n t i f f ' s refusal to accept h is recommendation of 
jo in t custody and ruled for jo in t custody anyway at the 
conclusion of the t r i a l . 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT Ir THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN NOT AWARDING PLAINTIFF THE CARE, 
CUSTODY, AND CONTROL OF BOTH CHILDREN, 
AND THE AWARD ' OF PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF 
HEATHER LYN DEEBEN TO DEFENDANT IS NOT 
IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
In divorce proceedings, including initial custody 
awards, trial courts are given broad discretion. Moody v. Moody, 
715 P.2d 507, 510 (Utah 1985). A trial court's custody 
determination on appeal should stand unless the evidence clearly 
shows that the custody determination was not in the best 
interests of the child or that the trial court misapplied 
principles of law. Smith v. Smith. 726 P.2d 423, 425 (Utah 
1986); Cox v. Cox. 532 P.2d 994, 996 (Utah 1975); 
Shiuii v. Shiuii. 712 P.2d 197 (Utah 1985); and Wiese v. Wiese. 
699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985) . 
However, if the review of custody determining is to be 
anything more than a superficial exercise of judicial power, the 
record on review must contain written findings of fact and 
conclusions of law by the trial judge which specifically set 
forth the reasons, based on those numerous factors which must be 
weighed in determining the best interests of the child and which 
support the custody decision. Hutchison v. Hutchison. 649 P.2d 
38, 42 (Utah 1982) . 
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In any determination of the best i n t e r e s t s of the 
chi ld , i t i s appropriate for court to consider the qual i ty of the 
c h i l d ' s present custody arrangement, the length of time the child 
spent in tha t arrangement, and the insecur i ty and emotional 
upheaval the child may suffer as a resu l t of any modification in 
custody. Hoqqe v. Hoqqe, 649 P.2d 51, 55 (Utah 1982). Heather 
Lyn Deeben had spent a l l two and one-half years of her l i f e in 
the care of her mother, p l a in t i f f herein, at the time of t r i a l . 
Of the c h i l d ' s 30 months of age, the defendant was physically 
absent from the child eighteen (18) months. Defendant was in 
basic t r a in ing for six months (Tr. , at 16, 17); the pa r t i e s 
separated between October and November, 1986 (Tr. , at 19); and 
the pa r t i e s separated in January, 1987 un t i l t r i a l in November, 
1987 (Tr. , a t 22) . In the l a s t year of Heather 's l i f e prior to 
the t r i a l , Heather l ived in defendant 's home for two months with 
p l a in t i f f , saw defendant in March for four days (Tr. , at 
105), for ten days in July, 1988, and every other weekend for two 
months before t r i a l (Tr . , at 105, 106). Thus, Heather had been 
in the sole care of p l a in t i f f for a long period of time before 
the t r i a l . 
All of the evidence indica tes Heather was bright and 
a l e r t , had an above average vocabulary, and appeared well 
adjusted (Home s tudy) . The qual i ty of her care while in the 
custody of p l a in t i f f i s se l f -ev ident . There was 
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no substantial reason given by the court to take Heather out 
of that environment. The Utah Supreme Court/ recognizing the 
importance of a stable environment has repeatedly announced the 
principal that: 
Notwithstanding the desires and 
contentions of the partiesf the 
welfare of the children is the 
paramount consideration of the 
courts/ and where custody has been 
determined/ and the children appear 
to be comparatively well adjusted 
and happy, they should not be 
compelled to change their home 
unless there appears some 
substantial reason for doing so. 
See Hogge v. Hogget 649 P.2d 51f 55; Trego v. Trego, 565 P.2df at 
75; Nielsen v. Nielsen, 620 P.2d at 512; Robinson v. Robinson, 
391 P.2d at 435. There was a Stipulation and Order granting 
plaintiff temporary custody of the children prior to trial/ 
and Heather had been solely in the plaintiff's care for ten 
months prior to trial. 
There was no compelling or substantial reason 
warranting the trial court in taking Heather from her mother's 
home. The trial court made a finding that plaintiff has been a 
better custodian of the child since returning to Utah and being 
in the home of her parents (Additional Findings of Fact #4/ at 
3). Also,the trial court admitted there was no major reason 
for changing custody but refused to follow the announced law 
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in t h i s s t a t e because the defendant had been in the mi l i ta ry 
service (Tr. , at 153, 154). 
The Court s ta ted , 
There i s another consideration jus t 
with the mi l i ta ry that we can ' t — 
normally our appel late courts have 
said we wil l ta lk about custody 
matters . We wi l l pre t ty much leave 
the children where they have been 
unless t h e r e ' s some major reason for 
changing them. If. we followed tha t 
in t h i s kind of a case, we would 
never consider the person who i s in 
the mi l i ta ry service for custody 
because they are always subject to 
tha t kind of a change of duty and 
t ha t l ike . . . . defendant, husband, 
was on his six months of basic 
t r a i n ing , there was no way tha t the 
family could be together (Tr. , at 
153, 154). (emphasis added). 
The t r i a l court cannot change the fac ts in t h i s case. The 
defendant has been physically absent from these chi ldrens ' most 
of the i r l i v e s . The fact t ha t he was absent because he was 
in the mi l i ta ry i s of no consequence. 
The t r i a l cou r t ' s posi t ion appears to be but for h is 
mi l i ta ry obl igat ions the defendant would have been an equal 
caretaker . The court adopted as a finding tha t past custody 
pat terns and the role of primary caretaker must be put in the 
context of defendant 's mi l i ta ry serv ice ; had he not been in the 
mi l i t a ry , both parents would have ranked as jo in t ly being 
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caretakers (Amended Findings of Fact #7 (N). Alsof the t r i a l 
court found the defendant spent as much time as a caretaker of 
the child as the p l a in t i f f when he was in the home and not 
f i l l i n g mi l i ta ry dut ies (Additional Findings of Fact #2, at 3 ) . 
The problem i s tha t defendant was away from home f i l l i n g mi l i ta ry 
obl iga t ions . The t r i a l court cannot change the fac t s of t h i s 
case. 
In Pusev v. Pusev, 728 P.2d 117, 120, (Utah 1986) the 
Utah Supreme Court held tha t the choice in competing child 
support claims should be based upon funct ion-related fac to r s . 
The court went on to hold, 
Prominent among these , though not 
exclusive, i s the iden t i ty of the 
primary caretaker during the 
marriage. Other fac tors should 
include the ident i ty of the parent 
with greater f l e x i b i l i t y to provide 
personal care for the child and the 
iden t i ty of the parent with whom the 
child has spent most of his time or 
her time pending custody 
determination if tha t period has 
been lengthy. 
The t r i a l court did find the p l a in t i f f to be the 
primary caretaker the majority of the time. (Additional Findings 
of Fact #2, at 2 ) . But according to the court t h i s was out of 
necessi ty , because of the defendant 's mi l i ta ry assignments during 
the year 1987. (Additional Findings of Fact #2, at 2 ) . The 
t r i a l court seems to be unwilling to recognize tha t for whatever 
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reason the plaintiff has been the primary and predominant 
caretaker of Heather. It is not disputed that Heather has spent 
most of her time with the plaintiff pending custody 
determination. 
Not only did the trial court change the custody from 
the plaintiff, being the primary caretaker of Heather, it made a 
split custody award of the children. In Hutchison and 
Jorgensen vs. Jorgensen, 599 P.2d 510 (Utah 1979), the Supreme 
Court stated a factor to consider in awarding custody was the 
preference of keeping siblings together. Specifically, in 
Jorgensen, at 512, the Court held,: 
While it is true that a child 
custody award which keeps all the 
children of the marriage united is 
generally preferred to one which 
divides them between the parents, 
that preference is not binding in 
the face of consideration dictating 
a contrary course of action. 
In Pusey, supra, the Supreme Court affirmed a split 
custody award. However, the court stressed the twelve year old 
son manifested a strong preference for his father, which caused 
friction and ill feelings between him and his mother. That is 
not the case in this custody dispute. Heather is two and one-
half years old. Furthermore, in Findings of Fact #7B the court 
found the children's feelings are not susceptible to making an 
expression of choice between the parents. Plaintiff testified as 
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to the closeness of Heather to Kevin as she pretended to be 
h is mother when playing with him (Tr . , a t 57) . Defendant 
t e s t i f i e d he thought i t was extremely important the two 
children should be together (Tr. , a t 113). 
In a child custody dispute , the extent to which each 
contesting parent could care for the child personally i s an 
appropriate consideration for the court . Lembach v. Cox, 639 
P.2d 197, 200 (Utah 1981). The t r i a l court fa i led to consider or 
make a specif ic finding which parent could spend more time 
personally with the chi ldren. However, Mr. Watson in his 
home study and custody evaluation predicted tha t p l a in t i f f "will 
do more actual parenting tha t wi l l defendant due to his work 
and c lass schedules" (Home study at 6 ) . 
In Hutchison our Supreme Court has l i s t e d cer ta in other 
factors in determining the c h i l d ' s best i n t e r e s t s . Those factors as 
they re la te primarily to the c h i l d ' s feel ing or special needs a r e : 
The preference of the chi ld ; keeping 
s ib l ings together ; the r e l a t i ve 
strength of the c h i l d ' s bond with 
one or both of the prospective 
custodians; and in appropriate 
cases, the general in t e res t in 
continuing previously determined 
custody arrangements where the child 
i s happy and well adjusted. 
Hutchinson at 41 . 
In t h i s case, Heather i s too young to s t a t e a 
preference and the court has so found. As to keeping s ibl ings 
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togetherf there is no question plaintiff should be awarded 
custody of the youngest child, Kevinf as she was nursing him at 
the time of trial. 
Heather, therefore/ should rightfully remain with 
plaintiff in order to keep the children together. Mr. Watson 
observed Kevin to be a healthyf happy child and a very mellow 
baby (Home study, at 4). He found Kevin, being nursed and at 
this state in his life, closely bonded to the mother and should 
not, in any case, be absent from the mother for any great 
length of time (Home study, at 5, 6). 
As to the relative strength of Heather's bond with one 
or both of the prospective custodians, the Court made no finding. 
However, Heather has spent almost totally all of her life 
with plaintiff. Finally, in maintaining the general interest 
in continuing previously determined custody arrangements where 
the child is happy and well adjusted the trial court gave no 
substantial or compelling reason for changing custody. 
The court found both parties to be fit and proper parents 
to be awarded joint custody of the children. The court found 
plaintiff to be a better custodian since returning to Utah. The 
court found plaintiff was not an ideal caretaker in Texas 
and the child was not always properly fed, diapered, or put to 
bed at a reasonable hour by plaintiff (Additional Findings of 
Fact #2, at 2). These facts were vigorously disputed by 
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p la in t i f f (Tr . , at 39) . Defendant claimed to be the primary 
caretaker of Heather while in Texas (Tr. , at 106). But he blamed 
Heather 's diaper rash on p la in t i f f (Tr. f at 106). When asked 
if he had occasion to change diapers and pa r t i c ipa t e in the care 
of Heather, the defendant said nOhf Yes. Several t imes." (Tr. , 
a t 83) . Defendant admitted a t one time Heather was being t rea ted 
for a yeast infect ion which could account for diaper rash (Tr. , 
a t 106). If defendant, as he claims to be, was the primary 
caretaker in Texas, why does he not assume primary respons ib i l i ty 
for the diaper rash. The worst evidence of lack of care defendant 
a s se r t s i s a diaper rash. I t cer ta in ly i s not uncommon for 
babies to develop diaper rash. Defendant admits the children 
have not been hospi ta l ized for i n ju r i e s , abuse, or lack of care 
(Tr. , a t 110). 
Defendant's mother t e s t i f i e d she v i s i t ed defendant, the 
p la in t i f f , and Heather while they were l iv ing in Texas (Tr. , at 
115). She t e s t i f i e d tha t Heather was very outgoing, talked a 
l o t , had a lo t of fun, was jus t excited about everything (Tr. , 
a t 116) . From that observation, i t does not appear Heather fared 
too poorly while l iv ing in Texas. 
Defendant t e s t i f i e d on several occasions, when picking 
up Heather for the weekend she wouldn't go to sleep upon t rying 
to put her to bed (Tr. , a t 89) . He described her as completely 
le tharg ic but not wi l l ing to sleep, or was hyperactive and would 
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stay up l a t e a t night (Tr. , at 89) . Defendant a t t r ibu ted t h i s 
to Heather being given drugs because "I have seen people on drug 
withdrawals" (Tr. , a t 89) . 
As to Kevin, defendant described him as being 
l e tha rg i c , and we would have a rough time waking him. up for 
anything (Tr. , at 89) . When he was awake, he would lay there . 
He wouldn't play. We would have toys there for him. He wouldn't 
even watch them (Tr . , at 89) . However, defendant noticed a 
substant ia l difference in Kevin af ter he reported p l a in t i f f to 
Social Services for child abuse for al legedly giving the child 
paregoric . After the report was made, the next time defendant 
picked him up he was act ive and l ike a child his own age (Tr. , 
a t 89) . 
Apparently, defendant does not recognize tha t babies 
two to three months old don ' t play with toys and they appear 
l e tha rg ic because they sleep most of the time. Even if the 
defendant did not recognize tha t fact the t r i a l court should have. 
In Hutchison, the Supreme Court stated other factors 
meriting consideration in custody disputes relate primarily to the 
prospective custodians' character or status or to their capacity 
or willingness to function as parents: 
Moral character and emotional 
stability; ability to provide 
personal rather than surrogate care; 
significant impairment of ability to 
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function as a parent through drug 
abusef excessive drinking, or other 
cause; reasons for having 
relinquished custody in the past; 
religious compatibility with the 
child; kinship, including, in 
extraordinary circumstances, step 
parent status; and financial 
conditions.Hutchinson at 41. 
The court found the moral character of each party to be 
the same (Amended Findings of Fact #7H). The court found both 
parties to be emotionally immature to some degree with plaintiff 
having expressed suicidal tendencies on at least two occasions. 
One of these occasions occurred during an argument when defendant 
threatened to take Heather away from her and the other was 
apparently before their marriage in September, 1984. 
The court found the depth of desire to be a responsible 
parent has been exhibited by the defendant by taking a hardship 
discharge and giving up a good job. (Amended Findings of Fact 
#7J). The court failed to find or overlooked the fact that 
defendant stated he took a hardship discharge because he needed 
surgery and there was a 50/50 chance of permanent injury after 
surgery (Hearing Sept. 8, 1987, at 9). 
As to the ability to provide personal rather than 
surrogate care, the court found both parents are limited by work 
and school but that plaintiff is limited by the needs of Kevin 
(Amended Findings of Fact #7L). The trial court overlooked the 
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recommendation and predic t ion of Mr. Watson's home study tha t 
p l a in t i f f wi l l do more actual parenting tha t wi l l defendant do 
to his work and c lass schedules (Home study, at 6 ) . The t r i a l 
court found tha t Kevin wi l l l imi t p l a i n t i f f ' s a b i l i t y to parent 
Heather. This finding f l i e s in the face of the consideration 
tha t s ibl ings should be kept together as s ta ted by our Supreme 
Court. I t appears tha t the t r i a l court i s of the opinion tha t 
bonding between s ibl ings never becomes so strong tha t one 
parent should be denied a r ight to have custody of one of the 
children to sa t is fy the other pa ren t ' s wishes. 
The court found no impairment of either party due to 
drug usef excessive drinking or other concern. Alsof religion 
factors and kinship factors rank equally with either party. 
As to f inancial conditions/ the pa r t i e s are equal except 
as to possibly housing. Mr. Watson's assessment was tha t 
p l a i n t i f f ' s housing conditions were somewhat constr ic ted but 
to le rab le and would probably resolve i t s e l f when p l a i n t i f f ' s 
s i s t e r returned to college (Home study, at 2 ) . 
The t r i a l court s tated he believed p lan t i f f improperly 
used paregoric on the children (Tr. , at 160). P la in t i f f 
t e s t i f i e d she gave Heather paregoric because she had the flu f had 
been throwing up for two days and had diarrhea (Tr. , at 58) . 
Pepto-Bismol was not curing i t so she and her mother gave Heather 
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paregoric (Tr., at 58). Paregoric was only given to Heather 
when the doctor prescribed it (Tr., at 63) and never given to 
Kevin (Tr.f at 64). For the trial court to find paregoric was 
given improperly to the children and without a doctor's 
prescription is not supported by the record. 
It should be noted, that defendant obtained his 
hardship discharge around the first of September, 1987 (Hearing, 
September 8, 1987 at 8, 9) about two months prior to trial the 
on November 13, 1987. During those two months, defendant twice 
reported plaintiff to the Department of Social Studies for 
alleged child abuse (Tr., at 57). Once for a bruise on 
Heather's thigh and the other for giving Heather paragoric for 
stomach flu (Tr., at 5 8). Plaintiff had never been accused 
of neglect or allegedly abusing her children until just two 
months before the trial. The timing of these reports to the 
Department of Social Services is not accidental on the part of 
the defendant. 
Plaintiff has expressed far more maturity about 
the situation having not reported defendant to Social Services 
when Heather returned home from a weekend visit with a cut lip 
and gums. Defendant admitted Heather fell against a coffee 
table and cut her lips and gums while in his care . (Tr., at 
110). Defendant admitted accidents apparently do happen to 
children (Tr., at 110). 
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The Home Study and Custody E v a l u a t i o n by S t e v e n 
Watson c o u l d n o t c o l l a b o r a t e t h e o v e r u s e of p a r a g o r i c w i t h t h e 
c h i l d r e n . The m e d i c a t i o n had been p r e s c r i b e d by a Dr. White fo r 
a s e v e r e s tomach f l u (Home S t u d y , a t 5 ) . As t o t h e a l l e g e d 
b r u i s i n g t o t h e t h i g h of H e a t h e r , by p l a i n t i f f ' s f a t h e r , Mr. 
Watson cou ld n o t a c c o u n t fo r t h e same. He n o t e d Hea the r e x p r e s s e d , 
no f e a r of Mr. Guiver and r e p o r t e d l y was v i r t u a l l y a "shadow" t o 
him (Home S t u d y , a t 5 ) . 
POINT I I ; THE FINDINGS OF FACT ADOPTED BY 
THE COUNT ARE INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE AWARD OF CUSTODY OF 
HEATHER LYN DEEBEN TO DEFENDANT. 
The Utah Supreme Cour t h a s c l e a r l y announced t h e 
p r i n c i p a l t h a t : 
N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e d e s i r e s and 
c o n t e n t i o n s of t h e p a r t i e s , t h e 
w e l f a r e of t h e c h i l d r e n i s t h e p a r a -
mount c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e c o u r t s , 
and where c u s t o d y has been d e t e r m i n e d 
and t h e c h i l d r e n a p p e a r t o be 
c o m p a r a t i v e l y w e l l a d j u s t e d and happy , 
t h e y s h o u l d n o t be compe l l ed t o change 
t h e i r home v a l u e s t h e r e a p p e a r s some 
s u b s t a n t i a l r e a s o n fo r d o i n g s o . 
H u t c h i n s o n a t 4 1 . 
In t h i s c a s e i t i s u n d i s p u t e d t h a t Hea the r had 
been c o n t i n u o u s l y i n he r m o t h e r ' s c a r e a l l her e n t i r e l i f e . 
D e f e n d a n t , d u r i n g t h e t e n months b e f o r e t r i a l , was a b s e n t fom t h e 
c h i l d ' s l i f e e x c e p t f o r v i s i t a t i o n p u r p o s e s . I t i s a l s o 
- 3 0 -
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undisputed that Heather was observed to be bright, active, 
curious, quite well developed physically and mentally, who 
adapted to the life style of each home. There is no evidence 
Heather is not a comparatively healthy and well adjusted child. 
In Pusey, at 120, the Supreme Court stated the 
prominient factor to consider is a custody award to the identity 
of the primary caretaker. In this case there is a finding that 
plaintff has been the primary caretaker of Heather. The fact 
defendant was absent because he was in the military does not 
alter the fact plaintiff was the primary caretaker of Heather. 
The trial court admitted there were no. major reason for 
changing custody except defendant had been in the military and 
therefore was not on equal footing with the plaintiff (Tr., at 
154). Also, it is to be noted the trial thought enough of 
plaintiff's parenting abilities to find her a fit and proper 
parent for joint custody of Heather and physical custody of 
Kevin. If plaintiff is good enough to be the primary custodian 
of Kevin why isn't she good enough to be the primary custodian of 
Heather. 
It is submitted the trial court did not state any 
substantial reason for changing custody of Heather and relied 
upon disputed, immaterial allegations of diaper-rash, and of 
giving paragoric to a sick child. The Home Study and Custody 
Recommendation addressed every issue raised by defendant at 
-31-
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trial and found him to be lacking and the best interest of 
Heather to be served by plaintiff. 
It is further submitted the other Findings of Fact 
adopted by the court are insufficient to support the award of 
custody of Heather to defendant. Upon review, the findings 
of the Court cannot be supported by reference to the trial 
record. The findings simply do not support a significant 
reason for taking Heather out of her present environment. The 
findings against the plaintiff are of a minor/ insignficiant 
nature not rising to the level waranting a change of custody. 
One would think there would be a fundamentally sound reason given 
for changing custody, but there is none given in this case. 
The trial judge was apparently angered because 
plaintiff refused to accept his recommendation of joint custody 
made to the parties before trial. It is submitted the trial 
court's anger is revealed in his opening statement at the 
beginning of the trial (Tr. at 2), and it retrospect, the trial 
court predicted the results of the trial before it started. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, plaintiff 
respectfully requests that this Court modify the joint custody 
award of Heather Lyn Deeben by giving custody of Heather to 
plaintiff. 
-32-
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RESPECTFULLY, subm i t t e d t h i s /Lr> c day of December, 
1988. 
CAMPBELL & NEELEY 
ROBERT L. NEELEY 
Attorney for Plaintiff/£ppellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this /(n day of December, 
1988, I mailed eight copies of the above and foregoing Brief of 
Appellent to the clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals, 400 Midtown 
Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 and four 
copies to Dale E. Stratford, attorney for Defendant/ Respondent, 
1218 First Securtiy Bank Bldg. Ogden, Utah 84401. 
2RT L. NI 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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DALE E. STRATFORD 
Attorney a t Law 
1218 F i r s t Secur i ty Bank Bldg 
Ogden, Utah, 84401 
Telephone: 393-7085 




DERICK. R. DEEBEN ) 
Defendant. ] 
) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil 40735 
The above e n t i t l e d m a t t e r having come on r e g u l a r l y for 
h e a r i n g on the 13th day of November, 1987, and p l a i n t i f f appear ing 
and be ing r e p r e s e n t e d by her a t t o r n e y , ROBERT L. NEELEY, and the 
defendant appear ing and be ing r e p r e s e n t e d by h i s a t t o r n e y , DALE E. 
STRATFORD and each of the p a r t i e s having ca l l ed and p resen ted 
w i t n e s s e s and the Court having cons ide red a l l evidence p resen ted 
t o i t , i n c l u d i n g the w r i t t e n r e p o r t of Steven L. Watson, psycho-
t h e r a p i s t , and having cons idered the argument of counse l , and the 
Court hav ing en te red i t s F ind ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
now t h e r e f o r e e n t e r s i t s Order : 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that each of 
the p a r t i e s are f i t and proper persons to have the care , custody 
and control of the minor chi ldren and that each of the par t i e s 
be and hereby are awarded j o i n t custody of the two minor ch i ldren , 
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with the defendant having primary care for the minor child Heather 
and the plaintiff having primary care for the minor child Kevin. 
It Is further ordered that each of the parties share with one 
another, any and all medical matters, school matters, church 
matters or social matters Involving the minor children. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that neither 
party has Health and Accident and/or dental insurance coverage for 
the children at this time, and be and hereby are required to pay 
one-half of all medical costs that are incurred by each child in 
each home. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
defendant pay the sum of $80.00 per month as and for child support 
for the minor child Kevin, which child resides in the home of the 
plaintiff. The Court will hold in abeyance any order that the 
plaintiff pay to the defendant child support for the support of 
the minor child Heather. That at such time as the plaintiff 
finishes her schooling, that the Court would expect the Uniform 
Child Support Schedule to apply in determining the child support 
that the plaintiff would be required to pay to the defendant for 
the support of the minor child Heather. As the defendants earning 
capacity Increases the Uniform Child Support Schedule should be 
used to determine the support to be paid to the plaintiff for the 
support of the minor child Kevin. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that there be 
an evaluation of the child support on the 1st of January of each 
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year to determine If the Uniform Schedule should d i c t a t e a payment 
of a greater ch i ld support than that heretofore ordered by the 
Court. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
v i s i t a t i o n for the chi ldren and the parents should be as fo l lows: 
The p l a i n t i f f s h a l l v i s i t with the minor chi ld Heather 
every o the r weekend and have a l t e r n a t e h o l i d a y s . The defendant 
s h a l l have v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s w i th the minor c h i l d Kevin for 45 
minutes p r i o r t o the t ime t h a t the minor ch i ld Heather i s d e l i v e r -
ed to the home of the p l a i n t i f f and 45 minutes when the defendant 
a r r i v e s a t t he home of the p l a i n t i f f to pick up the minor c h i l d 
Hea the r . P rov ided , however, the defendant may, i f he so d e s i r e s , 
v i s i t wi th the minor c h i l d Kevin, between the hours of 3:00 p.m. 
and 7:00 p.m. on Sa tu rday . I f the defendant i s going to exe rc i s e 
t h e v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s from 3:00 to 7:00 p.m. on Saturday, the 
p l a i n t i f f should be n o t i f i e d 24 hours in advance. However, a f t e r 
a pe r iod of one y e a r , then the minor c h i l d r e n s h a l l v i s i t w i th 
bo th of the p a r e n t s on a l t e r n a t e weekends. I t being the s p e c i f i c 
d e s i r e of t he Court t h a t both c h i l d r e n be in the home of the same 
pa ren t on weekends so t h a t each of the pa ren t s w i l l have the 
oppo r tun i t y t o have both c h i l d r e n t oge the r in t h e i r home on a l t e r -
n a t e weekends. I t i s the i n t e n t of the Court that for the f i r s t 
yea r t h a t the defendant make the necessary arrangements to de l iver 
the chi ld Heather to the home of the p l a i n t i f f , inasmuch as t h e r e 
i s s u b s t a n t i a l t rave l d is trance between the homes of the two 
p a r t i e s . Provided further, however, a f t er a period of one year , 
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the transportation of the minor children shall alternate. One 
weekend it would be the responsibllty of the plaintiff and the 
other the responsibility of the defendant. 
Summer vacation with the minor children should include a 
full month in each of the homes of both parents, so that the 
mother would have both children in her home from June 15th to July 
15th of each year. Provided, however, that one weekend in the 
middle of the month, the defendant would pick up both children for 
that weekend. The defendant should have both children In his home 
between July 16th and August 15th, provided however, the plaintiff 
would have one weekend with the children in the middle of the 
month. Each of the parties are to notify the other party as to 
which weekend during the summer visitation they would desire to 
exercise their visitation with the minor children. 
That there are special events in the lives of both 
parties, such as family reunions and other activities which may 
not fall on the appropriate weekend or during the summer month 
visitation, and consideration for each others needs as to special 
events should In fact be considered and if possible, accomodated 
or schedules so arranged by both parties to meet those needs and 
desires so far as visitation with the minor children. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that each of 
the parties are capable of paying their own attorney fees and 
costs incurred in connection with this matter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that certain 
property, including various quilts, clothing and various toys are 
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in fact the personal property of the minor child Heather and that 
her property should be with her, except that the plaintiff should 
retain such clothing and toys as would be necessary for her while 
she visits with the plaintiff in the plaintiff's home. The 
plaintiff also has possession of two keepsake dolls and cabbage 
patch dolls which are the property of the minor child Heather• 
Those items should remain in the possession of the plaintiff for 
the benefit of the minor child, Heather. All other items of 
personal property of the minor child should be turned over to the 
defendant for the use and benefit of the minor child, Heather. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that each of 
the parties, prior to the commencement of this action, had their 
own personal property in their possession and those properties are 
to be the property of the person who has them in their possession. 
Provided, however, that there was introduced at the time of trial, 
a list of wedding gifts which the parties have agreed would be 
divided are listed on the attached sheet. All items bearing a 
check were to be turned over to the defendant as his sole and 
separate property. The remaining items of wedding gifts were to 
become the personal property of the plaintiff and should be 
delivered to the defendant immediately. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
defendant be and hereby is awarded as his sole and separate 
property the 1978 Pickup truck, a VCR and television, which the 
plaintiff has indicated she does not claim an interest in and they 
should be the property of the defendant. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that all the 
quilts, other than the quilt that belonged to the child, Heather, 
be and hereby are the property of the plaintiff* 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that each of 
the parties be required to pay any debts that they may have 
incurred since the time of their separation. Inasmuch as the 
plaintiff, at the time of the birth of the minor child, Kevin, 
chose not to use the medical facilities available to her without 
her cost and which was provided by the defendant through his 
military service, that the plaintiff should be required to pay any 
and all medical bills that may have been incurred in connection 
with the birth of the child, Kevin. The defendant shall pay the 
debts and obligations due and owing to the Utah Valley Credit 
Union, of approximately $2400.00 and the obligation for the 
jewelry purchased by the parties in the sum of approximately 
$400.00 and the J. C. Penney Account in the sum of approximately 
$300.00 and hold the defendant harmless therefrom. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
transfer of custody occur immediately after the court hearing of 
November 13, 1987 and the transfer of all properties occur 
immediately thereafter. ,, 
\^h 
DATED this j^^v^sy of January, 1988. 
WTE OF UTAH ) 
UNTY OF DAVIS ) SS 
THE UNDERSIGNED, CLERK OF THE DISTRICT 
•URT OF DAVIS COUNTY, UTAH DO HEREBY CER-
Y THAT THE ANNEXED AND FOREGOING IS A 
UE AND FULL COPY OF AN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT 
I FILE IN MY OFFICE AS SUCH CLERK. 
WITNESS MY HAND SEAL OF SAID OFFICE 
IIS^AY OF ^IftrfWffly iJS? 
DISTRICT COUT JUDGE 
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DALE E. STRATFORD 
Attorney at Law 
1218 F i r s t Security Bank Bldg 
Ogden, Utah, 84401 
Telephone: 393-7085 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JANETTE DEEBEN ) FINDINSS OF FACT and 
P l a i n t i f f , ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
-vs- ) • . 
Civil 40735 
DERICK R. DEEBEN ) 
Defendant. ) 
The above e n t i t l e d matter having come on regularly for 
hearing on the 13th day of November, 1987, and p l a i n t i f f appearing 
and being represented by her attorney, ROBERT L. NEELEY, and the 
defendant appearing and being represented by his attorney, DALE E. 
STRATFORD and each of the part i e s having ca l led and presented 
witnesses and the Court having considered a l l evidence presented 
to i t , including the wr i t ten report of Steven L. Watson, psycho-
t h e r a p i s t , and having considered the argument of counsel , the 
Court now therefore enters i t s : 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. That the p l a i n t i f f was a resident of Davis County, 
Utah for a period in excess of three months prior to the f i l i n g of 
t h i s act ion. 
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2. That the plaintiff and defendant are husband and 
wife having been married on the 6th day of September, 1984. 
3. That as a result of the marriage between the parties 
two children have been born as issue of the marriage, to wit: 
HEATHER LYN DEEBEN, born March 1, 1985 and KEVIN ROY DEEBEN, born 
July 1, 1987. 
4. That since the marriage and particularly during the 
last number of months the parties have developed irreconcilable 
differences and each of the parties are entitled to be granted a 
divorce, one from the other. 
5. That the each of the parties are equally capable of 
supporting the family as the other and the plaintiff, having made 
arrangements to work outside the home and the defendant having 
made arrangements to complete his education, the Court finds that 
no alimony need be awarded to either party. 
6. The Court finds that the defendant is not delinquent 
in any of his child support obligations up to the time of the 
granting of the divorce and specifically finds that the August, 
1987 payment of $240.00 was paid as well as the other monthly 
obligations which the Court had ordered to be paid. 
7. The Court finds that each of the parties are fit and 
proper persons to have the care, custody and control of the minor 
children and the Court finds that each of the parties should be 
awarded joint custody of the two minor children, with the 
defendant having primary care for the minor child Heather and the 
plaintiff having primary care for the minor child Kevin. It being 
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the specific intention of the Court that each of the parties share 
with one another, any and all medical matters, school matters, 
church matters or social matters involving the minor children. 
8. The Court finds that neither party has Health and 
Accident and/or dental insurance coverage for the children at this 
time. Each should be required to pay one-half of all medical 
costs that are incurred by each child in each home. 
9. Defendant is capable of paying $80.00 per month as 
and for child support for the minor child Kevin, which child 
resides in the home of the plaintiff. The Court will hold in 
abeyance any order that the plaintiff pay to the defendant child 
support for the support of the minor child Heather. The court 
would find, however, that at such time as the plaintiff finishes 
her schooling, that the Court would expect the Uniform Child 
Support Schedule to apply in determining the child support that 
the plaintiff would be required to pay to the defendant for the 
support of the minor child Heather. As the defendants earning 
capacity increases the Uniform Child Support Schedule should be 
used to determine the support to be paid to the plaintiff for the 
support of the minor child Kevin. 
10. The Court further finds that there should be an 
evaluation of the child support on the 1st of January of each year 
to determine if the Uniform Schedule should dictate a payment of a 
greater child support than that heretofore ordered by the Court. 
11. The Court further finds that visitation for the 
children and the parents should be as follows: 
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The plaintiff shall visit with the minor child Heather 
every other weekend and have alternate holidays. The defendant 
shall have visitation rights with the minor child Kevin for 45 
minutes prior to the time that the minor child Heather is deliver-
ed to the home of the plaintiff and 45 minutes when the defendant 
arrives at the home of the plaintiff to pick up the minor child 
Heather. Provided, however, the defendant may, if he so desires, 
visit with the minor child Kevin, between the hours of 3:00 p.m. 
and 7:00 p.m. on Saturday. If the defendant is going to exercise 
the visitation rights from 3:00 to 7:00 p.m. on Saturday, the 
plaintiff should be notified 24 hours in advance. However, after 
a period of one year, then the minor children shall visit with 
both of the parents on alternate weekends. It being the specific 
desire of the Court that both children be in the home of the same 
parent on weekends so that each of the parents will have the 
opportunity to have both children together in their home on alter-
nate weekends. It is the intent of the Court that for the first 
year that the defendant make the necessary arrangements to deliver 
the child Heather to the home of the plaintiff, inasmuch as there 
is substantial travel distrance between the homes of the two 
parties. Provided further, however, after a period of one year, 
the transportation of the minor children shall alternate. One 
weekend it would be the responsiblity of the plaintiff and the 
other the responsibility of the defendant. 
Summer vacation with the minor children should include a 
full month in each of the homes of both parents, so that the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
mother would have both children in her home from June 15th to July 
15th of each year. Provided, however, that one weekend in the 
middle of the month, the defendant would pick up both children for 
that weekend. The defendant should have both children in his home 
between July 16th and August 15th, provided however, the p l a i n t i f f 
would have one weekend with the chi ldren in the middle of the 
month. Each of the part ies are to not i fy the other party as to 
which weekend during the summer v i s i t a t i o n they would desire to 
exerc i se t h e i r v i s i t a t i o n with the minor chi ldren. 
The Court be l i eves and f i n d s , as a matter of fac t , that 
there are s p e c i a l events in the l i v e s of both parties , such as 
family reunions and other a c t i v i t i e s which may not f a l l on the 
appropriate weekend or during the summer month v i s i t a t i o n , and 
cons iderat ion for each others needs as to specia l events should in 
fact be considered and i f p o s s i b l e , accomodated or schedules so 
arranged by both part ies to meet those needs and desires so far as 
v i s i t a t i o n with the minor chi ldren. 
12 . The Court further finds that each of the parties are 
capable of paying the ir own attorney fees and costs incurred in 
connection with th i s matter. 
1 3 . The Court further f inds that certain property, 
including various q u i l t s , c lothing and various toys are in fact 
the personal property of the minor ch i ld Heather and that her 
property should be with her, except that the p l a i n t i f f should 
re ta in such c lothing and toys as would be necessary for her while 
she v i s i t s with the p l a i n t i f f in the p l a i n t i f f ' s home. The 
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plaintiff also has possession of two keepsake dolls and cabbage 
patch dolls which are the property of the minor child Heather. 
Those items should remain in the possession of the plaintiff for 
the benefit of the minor child, Heather. All other items of 
personal property of the minor child should be turned over to the 
defendant for the use and benefit of the minor child, Heather. 
14. Each of the parties, prior to the commencement of 
this action, had their own personal property in their possession 
and those properties are to be the property of the person who has 
them in their possession. Provided, however, that there was 
introduced at the time of trial, a list of wedding gifts which the 
parties have agreed would be divided are listed on the attached 
sheet. All items bearing a check were to be turned over to the 
defendant as his sole and separate property. The remaining items 
of wedding gifts were to become the personal property of the 
plaintiff and should be delivered to the defendant immediately. 
15. The defendant has in his possesion the 1978 Pickup 
truck, a VCR and television, which the plaintiff has indicated she 
does not claim an interest in and they should be the property of 
the defendant. 
16. During the course of the trial, testimony was given 
concerning the various quilts and the court finds, as a matter of 
fact, that all the quilts, other than the quilt that belonged to 
the child, should become the property of the plaintiff. 
17. The Court further finds that with regard to the 
debts of.the parties that each of the parties should be required 
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to pay any debts that they may have incurred since the time of 
their separation. Inasmuch as the plaintiff, at the time of the 
birth of the minor child, Kevin, chose not to use the medical 
facilities available to her without her cost and which was 
provided by the defendant through his military service, that the 
plaintiff should be required to pay any and all medical bills that 
may have been incurred in connection with the birth of the child, 
Kevin, The Court, however, finds that the defendant should pay 
the debts and obligations due and owing to the Utah Valley Credit 
Union, of approximately $2400.00 and the obligation for the 
jewelry purchased by the parties in the sum of approximately 
$400.00 and the J. C. Penney Account in the sum of approximately 
$300.00. 
18. The Court finds as a matter of fact that it would 
be in the best interests of the children that the transfer of 
custody occur immediately after the court hearing of November 13, 
1987 and the transfer of all properties occur immediately there-
after. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court enters 
its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That each of the parties are fit and proper persons 
to have the care, custody and control of the minor children and 
that each of the parties should be awarded joint custody of the 
two minor children, with the defendant having primary care for the 
minor child Heather and the plaintiff having primary care for the 
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minor child Kevin. It being the specific intention of the Court 
that each of the parties share with one another, any and all 
medical matters, school matters, church matters or social matters 
involving the minor children. 
2. That neither party has Health and Accident and/or 
dental insurance coverage for the children at this time. Each 
should be required to pay one-half of all medical costs that are 
incurred by each child in each home. 
3. That defendant is to pay the sum of $80.00 per month 
as and for child support for the minor child Kevin, which child 
resides in the home of the plaintiff. The Court will hold in 
abeyance any order that the plaintiff pay to the defendant child 
support for the support of the minor child Heather. That at such 
time as the plaintiff finishes her schooling, that the Court would 
expect the Uniform Child Support Schedule to apply in determining 
the child support that the plaintiff would be required to pay to 
the defendant for the support of the minor child Heather. As the 
defendants earning capacity increases the Uniform Child Support 
Schedule should be used to determine the support to be paid to the 
plaintiff for the support of the minor child Kevin. 
4. That there be an evaluation of the child support on 
the 1st of January of each year to determine if the Uniform 
Schedule should dictate a payment of a greater child support than 
that heretofore ordered by the Court. 
5. That visitation for the children and the parents 
should be as follows: 
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The p l a i n t i f f sha l l v i s i t with the minor chi ld Heather 
every other weekend and have a l ternate ho l idays . The defendant 
s h a l l have v i s i t a t i o n r ight s with the minor chi ld Kevin for 45 
minutes prior to the time that the minor chi ld Heather i s de l iver -
ed to the home of the p l a i n t i f f and 45 minutes when the defendant 
arr ives at the home of the p l a i n t i f f to pick up the minor child 
Heather. Provided, however, the defendant may, i f he so des i re s , 
v i s i t with the minor chi ld Kevin, between the hours of 3:00 p.m. 
and 7:00 p.m. on Saturday. I f the defendant i s going to exercise 
the v i s i t a t i o n r igh t s from 3:00 to 7:00 p.m. on Saturday, the 
p l a i n t i f f should be n o t i f i e d 24 hours in advance. However, af ter 
a period of one year, then the minor children sha l l v i s i t with 
both of the parents on a l ternate weekends. I t being the spec i f i c 
des ire of the Court that both children be in the home of the same 
parent on weekends so that each of the parents w i l l have the 
opportunity to have both children together in the ir home on a l t e r -
nate weekends. I t i s the intent of the Court that for the f i r s t 
year that the defendant make the necessary arrangements to del iver 
the chi ld Heather to the home of the p l a i n t i f f , inasmuch as there 
i s substant ia l t rave l distrance between the homes of the two 
p a r t i e s . Provided further , however, a f ter a period of one year, 
the transportation of the minor children shal l a l t e r n a t e . One 
weekend i t would be the respons ib l i ty of the p l a i n t i f f and the 
other the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the defendant. 
Summer vacation with the minor children should include a 
f u l l month in each of the homes of both parents , so that the 
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mother would have both children in her home from June 15th to July 
15th of each year. Provided, however, that one weekend in the 
middle of the month, the defendant would pick up both children for 
that weekend. The defendant should have both children in his home 
between July 16th and August 15th, provided however, the plaintiff 
would have one weekend with the children in the middle of the 
month. Each of the parties are to notify the other party as to 
which weekend during the summer visitation they would desire to 
exercise their visitation with the minor children. 
That there are special events in the lives of both 
parties, such as family reunions and other activities which may 
not fall on the appropriate weekend or during the summer month 
visitation, and consideration for each others needs as to special 
events should in fact be considered and if possible, accomodated 
or schedules so arranged by both parties to meet those needs and 
desires so far as visitation with the minor children. 
6. That each of the parties are capable of paying their 
own attorney fees and costs incurred in connection with this 
matter. 
7. That certain property, including various quilts, 
clothing and various toys are in fact the personal property of the 
minor child Heather and that her property should be with her, 
except that the plaintiff should retain such clothing and toys as 
would be necessary for her while she visits with the plaintiff in 
the plaintiff's home. The plaintiff also has possession of two 
keepsake dolls and cabbage patch dolls which are the property of 
the minor child Heather. Those items should remain in the 
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possession of the plaintiff for the benefit of the minor child, 
Heather. All other items of personal property of the minor child 
should be turned over to the defendant for the use and benefit of 
the minor child, Heather. 
8. That each of the parties, prior to the commencement 
of this action, had their own personal property in their possess-
ion and those properties are to be the property of the person who 
has them in their possession. Provided, however, that there was 
introduced at the time of trial, a list of wedding gifts which the 
parties have agreed would be divided are listed on the attached 
sheet. All items bearing a check were to be turned over to the 
defendant as his sole and separate property. The remaining items 
of wedding gifts were to become the personal property of the 
plaintiff and should be delivered to the defendant immediately. 
9. That the defendant be awarded as his sole and separ-
ate property the 1978 Pickup truck, a VCR and television, which 
the plaintiff has indicated she does not claim an interest in and 
they should be the property of the defendant. 
10. That all the quilts, other than the quilt that 
belonged to the child, Heather, shall be the property of the 
plaintiff. 
11. That each of the parties be required to pay any 
debts that they may have incurred since the time of their separa-
tion. Inasmuch as the plaintiff, at the time of the birth of the 
minor child, Kevin, chose not to use the medical facilities avail-
able to her without her cost and which was provided by the 
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defendant through his military service, that the plaintiff should 
be required to pay any and all medical bills that may have been 
incurred in connection with the birth of the child, Kevin. The 
defendant shall pay the debts and obligations due and owing to the 
Utah Valley Credit Union, of approximately $2400.00 and the 
obligation for the jewelry purchased by the parties in the sum of 
approximately $400.00 and the J. C. Penney Account in the sum of 
approximately $300.00 and hold the defendant harmless therefrom. 
12. That the transfer of custody occur immediately 
after the court hearing of November 13, 1987 and the transfer of 
all properties occur immediately thereafter. 
13. That the transfer of custody occur immediately 
after the court hearing of November 13, 1987 and the transfer of 
all properties occur immediately thereafter. 
DATED this (fj%^ day of January, 1988. 
t~ u 
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DALE E. STRATFORD 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1218 First Security Bank Bldg 
Ogden, Utah, 84401 
Telephone: 393-7085 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JANETTE DEEBEN 
Plaintiff, 







FINDINGS OF FACT and 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil 40735 
The above entitled matter having come on regularly 
for hearing on the 13th day of November, 1987, and plaintiff 
appearing and being represented by her attorney, ROBERT L. 
NEELEY, and the defendant appearing and being represented by 
his attorney, DALE E. STRATFORD and each of the parties 
having called and presented witnesses and the Court having 
considered all evidence presented to it, including the 
written report of Steven L. Watson, psychotherapist, and 
having considered the argument of counsel, the Court now 
therefore enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. That the plaintiff was a resident of Davis 
County, Utah for a period in excess of three months prior to 
the filing of this action. 
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3. That as a result of the marriage between the 
parties two children have been born as issue of the 
marriage, to wit: HEATHER LYN DEEBEN, born March 1, 1985 
and KEVIN ROY DEEBEN, born July 1, 1987. 
4. That since the marriage and particularly during 
the last number of months the parties have developed 
irreconcilable differences and each of the parties are 
entitled to be granted a divorce, one from the other. 
5. That the each of the parties are equally capable 
of supporting the family as the other and the plaintiff, 
having made arrangements to work outside the home and the 
defendant having made arrangements to complete his 
education, the Court finds that no alimony need be awarded 
to either party. 
6. The Court finds that the defendant is not 
delinquent in any of his child support obligations up to the 
time of the granting of the divorce and specifically finds 
that the August, 1987 payment of $240.00 was paid as well as 
the other monthly obligations which the Court had ordered to 
be paid. 
7. The Court finds that each of the pa§ties are fit 
and proper persons to have the care, custody and control of 
the minor children and the Court finds that each of the 
parties should be awarded joint custody of the two minor 
children, with the defendant having primary Care for the 
minor child Heather and the plaintiff having primary care 
for the minor child Kevin. It being the specific intention 
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of the Court that each of the parties share with one 
another, any and all medical matters, school matters, church 
matters or social matters involving the minor children. 
The Court further finds as follows: 
A. The children's best interests and the special 
attributes of the parents determine the primary care and 
custody specified above. 
B. At this time, the children's feelings are not 
susceptible to making an expression of choice between 
parents. 
C. The child, Kevin, has a special need to be with 
the plaintiff while nursing. 
D. The child Heather has no particular special need 
to be with the plaintiff 
E. There is no particular special need created by 
any bond between siblings, there being no particular 
attachment of the sister to the new born brother at this 
time. 
F. The general interest of the child Heather is any 
particular current environment is not great. She is happy 
and well adjusted in the defendant's care. 
G. The character or stutus of both parents is the 
same. 
H. The capacity or willingness to act as the 
custodial parent for Heather is very great in the defendant. 
I. The moral character of both parents is the same. 
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J. Both parties exhibit emotional immaturity to 
some degree. However, the plaintiff has expressed suicidal 
tendencies on at least two occasions. 
K. The depth of desire to be a responsible parent 
has been exhibited by the defendant. He gave up what would 
have been a good job in the military for the possibility of 
having custody of his children. He took a hardship 
discharge from the military so that he could hopefully have 
custody of one or both of these children. 
L. Personal care for Heather will be shared with 
one or the other set of grandparents, no matter which party 
has primary custody. Both parents are limited by work and 
school. The plaintiff is further limited by the needs of 
the infant child Kevin. 
M. Neither party suffers from impairment. Both 
parties love the children and want what is best for the 
children. 
N. Past custody patterns and the role of primary 
caretaker must be put into the context of the defendant's 
military service. Had he not been in the military, both 
parents would have ranked as jointly being caretakers. 
0. When the parties were together in Texas, the 
plaintiff did not provide primary care for Heather 
exclusively. Instances of diaper rash, the unwise use of 
paregoric on the child, meal patterns and neglect were 
ameliorated by the defendants concern to be with Heather, to 
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do things with the child, and to do things for these 
problems. 
P. The plaintiff left the defendant in Texas, 
taking the children with her, and returned to her parent's 
home in Utah. Since then there have been indications of 
bruising on Heather. 
Q. Religious factors rank equally with either 
party. 
R. Kinship factors rank equally with either party. 
S. Housing conditions for Heather are better with 
the defendant, and are somewhat constricted with the 
plaintiff. The defendant and his parents were not always 
given the visitation that they had a right to under the 
Courtfs preliminary orders with custody in the plaintiff. 
For the child, Heather to enjoy the association of both 
parents in the future, primary custody is better in the home 
of the defendant. 
T. Each party is an equal contributor in whatever 
inability to get along in the marriage has been; no one more 
or less than the other. Both parties looked to "mom and 
dad" for decisions better made by the parties together. 
U. Cooperation and the give and take in making 
decisions for the children will be facilitated with primary 
custody of Heather being with the defendant. 
8. The court finds that neither party has Health 
and Accident and/or dental insurance coverage for the 
children at this time. Each should be required to pay one-
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half of all medical costs that are incurred by each child in 
each home. 
9. Defendant is capable of paying $80.00 per month 
as and for child support for the minor child Kevin, which 
child resides in the home of the plaintiff. The Court will 
hold in abeyance any order that the plaintiff pay to the 
defendant child support for the support of the minor child 
Heather. The court would find, however, that at such time 
as the plaintiff finishes her schooling, that the Court 
would expect the Uniform Child Support Schedule to apply in 
determining the child support that the plaintiff would be 
required to pay to the defendant for the support of the 
minor child Heather. As the defendants earning capacity 
increases the Uniform Child Support Schedule should be used 
to determine the support to be paid to the plaintiff for the 
support of the minor child Kevin. 
10. The Court further finds that there should be 
an evaluation of the child support on the 1st of January of 
each year to determine if the Uniform Schedule should 
dictate a payment of a greater child support than that 
heretofore ordered by the Court. 
11. The Court further finds that visitation for 
the children and the parents should be as follows: 
The Plaintiff shall visit with the minor child 
Heather every other weekend and have alternate holidays. 
The defendant shall have visitation rights with the minor 
child Kevin for 45 minutes prior to the time that the minor 
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child Heather is delivered to the home of the plaintiff and 
45 minutes when the defendant arrives at the home of the 
plaintiff to pick up the minor child Heather. Provided, 
however, the defendant may, if he so desires, visit with the 
minor child Kevin, between the hours of 3:00 p.m. and 7:00 
p.m. on Saturday. If the defendant is going to exercise the 
visitation rights from 3:00 to 7:00 p.m. on Saturday, the 
plaintiff should be notified 24 hours in advance. However, 
after a period of one year, then the minor children shall 
visit with both of the parents on alternate weekends. It 
being the specific desire of the Court that both children be 
in the home of the same parent on weekends so that each of 
the parents will have the opportunity to have both children 
together in their home on alternate weekends. It is the 
intent of the Court that for the first year that the 
defendant make the necessary arrangements to deliver the 
child Heather to the home of the plaintiff, inasmuch as 
there is substantial travel distance between the homes of 
the two parties. Provided further, however, after a period 
of one year, the transportation of the minor children shall 
alternate. One weekend it would be the responsibility of 
the plaintiff and the other the responsibility of the 
defendant. 
Summer vacation with the minor children should 
include a full month in each of the homes of both parents, 
so that the mother would have both children in her home from 
June 15th to July 15th of each year. Provided, however, that 
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one weekend in the middle of the month, the defendant would 
pick up both children for that weekend. The defendant 
should have both children in his home between July 16th and 
August 15th, provided however, the plaintiff would have one 
weekend with the children in the middle of the month. Each 
of the parties are to notify the other party as to which 
weekend during the summer visitation they would desire to 
exercise their visitation with the minor children. 
The Court believes and finds, as a matter of fact, 
that there are special events in the lives of both parties, 
such as family reunions and other activities which may not 
fall on the appropriate weekend or during the summer month 
visitation, and consideration for each others needs as to 
special events should in fact be considered and if possible, 
accommodated or schedules so arranged by both parties to 
meet those needs and desires so far as visitation with the 
minor children. 
12. The Court further finds that each of the 
parties are capable of paying their own attorney fees and 
costs incurred in connection with this matter. 
13. The Court further finds that certain property, 
including various quilts, clothing and various toys are in 
fact the personal property of the minor child Heather and 
that her property should be with her, except that the 
plaintiff should retain such clothing and toys as would be 
necessary for her while she visits with the plaintiff in the 
plaintiff's home. The plaintiff also has possession of two 
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keepsake dolls and cabbage patch dolls which are the 
property of the minor child Heather. Those items should 
remain in the possession of the plaintiff for the benefit of 
the minor child# Heather. All other items of personal 
property of the minor child should be turned over to the 
defendant for the use and benefit of the minor child, 
Heather. 
14. Each of the parties, prior to the commencement 
of this action, had their own personal property in their 
possession and those properties are to be the property of 
the person who has them in their possession. Provided, 
however, that there was introduced at the time of trial, a 
list of wedding gifts which the parties have agreed would be 
divided and are listed on the attached sheet. All items 
bearing a check were to be turned over to the defendant as 
his sole and separate property. The remaining items of 
wedding gifts were to become the personal property of the 
plaintiff and should be delivered to the defendant 
immediately. 
15. The defendant has in his possession the 1978 
Pickup truck, a VCR and television, which the plaintiff has 
indicated she does not claim an interest in and they should 
be the property of the defendant. 
16. During the course of the trial, testimony was 
given concerning the various quilts and the court finds, as 
a matter of fact, that all the guilts, other than the guilt 
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that belonged to the child, should become the property of 
the plaintiff. 
17. The Court further finds that with regard to the 
debts of the parties that each of the parties should be 
required to pay any debts that they may have incurred since 
the time of their separation. Inasmuch as the plaintiff, at 
the time of the birth of the minor child, Kevin, chose not 
to use the medical facilities available to her without her 
cost and which was provided by the defendant through his 
military service, that the plaintiff should be required to 
pay any and all medical bills that may have been incurred in 
connection with the birth of the child, Kevin. The Court, 
however, finds that the defendant should pay the debts and 
obligations due and owing to the Utah Valley Credit Union, 
of approximately $2400.00 and the obligation for the jewelry 
purchased by the parties in the sum of approximately $400.00 
and the J. C. Penney Account in the sum of approximately 
$300.00. 
18. The Court finds as a matter of fact that it 
would be in the best interests of the children that the 
transfer of custody occur immediately after the court 
hearing of November 13, 1987 and the transfer of all 
properties occur immediately thereafter. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
enters its: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That each of the parties are fit and proper 
persons to have the care, custody and control of the minor 
children and that each of the parties should be awarded 
joint custody of the two minor children, with the defendant 
having primary care for the minor child Heather and the 
plaintiff having primary care for the minor child Kevin. It 
being the specific intention of the Court that each of the 
parties share with one another, any and all medical matters, 
school matters, church matters or social matters involving 
the minor children. 
2. That neither party has health and Accident 
and/or dental insurance coverage for the children at this 
time. Each should be required to pay one-half of all 
medical costs that are incurred by each child in each home. 
3. That defendant is to pay the sum of $80.00 per 
month as and for child support for the minor child Kevin, 
which child resides in the home of the plaintiff. The Court 
will hold in abeyance any order that the plaintiff pay to 
the defendant child support for the support of the minor 
child Heather. That at such time as the plaintiff finishes 
her schooling, that the Court would expect the Uniform Child 
Support Schedule to apply in determining the child support 
that the plaintiff would be required to pay to the defendant 
for the support of the minor child Heather. As the 
defendants earning capacity increases the Uniform Child 
Support Schedule should be used to determine the support to 
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be paid to the plaintiff for the support of the minor child 
Kevin. 
4. That there be an evaluation of the child support 
on the 1st of January of each year to determine if the 
Uniform Schedule should dictate a payment of a greater child 
support than that heretofore ordered by the Court. 
5. That visitation for the children and the parents 
should be as follows: 
The plaintiff shall visit with the minor child 
Heather every other weekend and have alternate holidays. '"'*. 
The defendant shall have visitation rights with the minor 
child Kevin for 45 minutes prior to the time that the minor 
child Heather is delivered to the home of the plaintiff and 
45 minutes when the defendant arrives at the home of the 
plaintiff to pick up the minor child Heather. Provided, 
however, the defendant may, if he so desires, visit with the 
minor child Kevin, between the hours of 3:00 p.m. and 7:00 
p.m. on Saturday. If the defendant is going to exercise the 
visitation rights from 3:00 to 7:00 p.m. on Saturday, the 
plaintiff should be notified 24 hours in advance. However, 
after a period of one year, then the minor children shall 
visit with both of the parents on alternate weekends. It 
being the specific desire of the Court that both children be 
in the home of the same parent on weekends so that each of 
the parents will have the opportunity to have both children 
together in their home on alternate weekends. It is the 
intent of the Court that for the first year that the 
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defendant make the necessary arrangements to deliver the 
child Heather to the home of the plaintiff, inasmuch as 
there is substantial travel distance between the homes of 
the two parties. Provided further, however, after a period 
of one year, the transportation of the minor children shall 
alternate. One weekend it would be the responsibility of 
the plaintiff and the other the responsibility of the 
defendant. 
Sximmer vacation with the minor children should 
include a full month in each of the homes of both parents, 
so that the mother would have both children in her home from 
June 15th to July 15th of each year. Provided, however, the 
plaintiff would have one weekend with the children in the 
middle of the month. Each of the parties are to notify the 
other party as to which weekend during the summer visitation 
they would desire to exercise their visitation with the 
minor children. 
That there are special events in the lives of both 
parties, such as family reunions and other activities which 
may not fall on the appropriate weekend or during the summer 
month visitation, and consideration for each others needs as 
to a special event should in fact be considered and if 
possible, accommodated or schedules so arranged by both 
parties to meet those needs and desires so far as visitation 
with the minor children. 
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6. That each of the parties are capable of paying 
their own attorney fees and costs incurred in connection 
with this matter. 
7. That certain property, including various quilts, 
clothing and various toys are in fact the personal property 
of the minor child Heather and that her property should be 
wit her, except that the plaintiff should retain such 
clothing and toys as would be necessary for her while she 
visits with the plaintiff in the plaintiff's home. The 
plaintiff also has possession of two keepsake dolls and 
cabbage patch dolls which are the property of the minor 
child Heather. Those items should remain in the possession 
of the plaintiff for the benefit of the minor child, 
Heather. All other items of personal property of the minor 
child should be turned over to the defendant for the use and 
benefit of the minor child, Heather. 
8. That each of the parties, prior to the 
commencement of this action, had their own personal property 
in their possession and those properties are to be the 
property of the person who has them in their possession. 
Provided, however, that there was introduced at the time of 
trial, a list of wedding gifts which the parties have agreed 
would be divided are listed on the attached sheet. All 
items bearing a check were to be turned over to the 
defendant as his sole and separate property. The remaining 
items of wedding gifts were to become the personal property 
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of the plaintiff and should be delivered to the defendant 
immediately. 
9. That the defendant be awarded as his sole and 
separate property the 1978 Pickup truck, a VCR and 
television, which the plaintiff has indicated she does not 
claim an interest in and they should be the property of the 
defendant. 
10. That all the quilts, other than the quilt that 
belonged to the child, Heather, shall be the property of the 
plaintiff. 
11. That each of the parties be required to pay any 
debts that they may have incurred since the time of their 
separation. Inasmuch as the plaintiff, at the time of the 
birth of the minor child, Kevin, chose not to use the 
medical facilities available to her without her cost and 
which was provided by the defendant through his military 
service, that the plaintiff should be required to pay any 
and all medical bills that may have been incurred in 
connection with the birth of the child, Kevin. The 
defendant shall pay the debts and obligations due and owing 
to the Utah Valley Credit Union, of approximately $2400.00 
and the obligation for the jewelry purchased by the parties 
in the sum of approximately $400.00 and the J. C. Penney 
Account in the sum of approximately $300.00 and hold the 
defendant harmless therefrom. 
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12. That the transfer of custody occur 
immediately after the court hearing of November 13, 1987 and 
the transfer of all properties occur immediately thereafter. 
DATED this^rEh day of: 1988. 
-DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
ROBERT L. NEELEY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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In the Second Judicial District Court 
in and for the 








Civil No. 40735 
This court received this case back from the Court of Appeals 
on June 10, 1988. On July 15, 1988, this court noticed it on the 
calendar for a hearing on August 9, 1988. On July 22, 1988, 
counsel for the defendant, Dale E. Stratford, filed a motion to 
amend findings of fact nunc pro tunc. This motion was 
accompanied by amended findings of fact. No one appeared for the 
August 9, 1988, hearing but the court was informed that Mr. 
Stratford had suffered a heart attack and been operated on and 
would be out of the office for at least one month. The court 
directed plaintiff's counsel, Robert L. Neeley to submit a 
memorandum. The court received this memorandum on September 14, 
1988. The court received nothing further from the defendant so 
it had the court clerk phone defendant's counsel on October 20, 
1988, and ask him to contact plaintiff's counsel and confer with 
the court. The plaintiff's counsel recently notified this court 
that he has not been contacted by defendant's counsel. The court 
is of the belief that it can proceed without anything further 
from either counsel and will proceed to make additional findings 
of fact. 
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The court originally found that both parties were fit and 
proper persons to be custodial parents. The court is not 
changing this basic finding. 
It is in the best interest of the children that the 
plaintiff and defendant be awarded joint custody but that Janette 
Deeben be awarded the physical care, custody, and control of 
Kevin Roy Deeben, born July 1, 1987, and that Derick R. Deeben be 
awarded the physical care, custody, and control of Heather Lyn 
Deeben. 
The court has this day adopted the amended findings of fact 
as its own which were submitted by the defendant on July 22, 
1988. In addition the court is going to make more specific 
findings of.fact as follows: 
(1) The parties married on September 4, 1984, and in early 
1986 the defendant entered military service in the Army. He was 
in New Jersey for basic training until the first of July. The 
parties then moved to Fort Hood, Texas. In January, 1987, the 
plaintiff returned to Utah. The parties were not getting along 
during this time. There were altercations. Each party used 
violence on the other party. The defendant hit and the plaintiff 
slapped and kicked. Both equally participated in provoking the 
fights and in fighting. Neither was just acting in reasonable 
self defense. The defendant was still in Fort Hood when this 
action was filed. He was forced to take a hardship discharge or 
be transferred to Germany. He chose the hardship discharge so 
that he could fight for custody of his children. 
(2) The plaintiff has been the primary careteiker the 
majority of the time until the court's ruling on January 19, 
1988. This was out of necessity, however, because of the 
defendant's military assignments during the year 1987. The 
plaintiff was not an ideal caretaker, however. The child was not 
always properly fed, diapered, or put to bed at a reasonable hour 
by the plaintiff. The defendant on returning at late hours from 
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military duty would on occasion have to fill those needs. The 
defendant spent as much time as a caretaker of the child as the 
plaintiff when he was in the home and not filling military 
duties. 
(3) The plaintiff used paregoric on the child on occasions 
when it was not medically necessary. This made the child 
lethargic and unable to sleep properly and neared the point of 
being habit forming. 
(4) The plaintiff has been a better custodian of the 
children, since returning to Utah and being in the home of her 
parents where she had the counsel and assistance of her parents 
and sisters. 
The court clerk is directed to send copies of these findings 
of fact to counsel and to return the file to the Court of 
Appeals. 
Dated November 2, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
"S<s *,*->/** 
JUDG^25 
Certificate of Mailing: 
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to Robert L. Neeley, 2485 
Grant Avenue, Suite 200, Ogden, Utah 84401 and Dale E. Stratford, 
1218 First Security Bank, Ogden, Utah 84401 on November 3, 1988. 
/KtL&U, /m/^t^ 
Deputy C&ferk 
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STEVEN L. WATSON, MSW, CSW 
PSYCHOTHERAPIST 
3480 Uathington Blvd.., §106 
OGDEN, UTAH 84403 
TELEPHONE (801) 479-8813 
HOME STUDY AND CUSTODY EVALUATION 
1 1 / 1 1 / 8 7 
S u b j e c t s : 
Janette Deeben 23 years 
2642 N. 225 W., Sunset, Utah 
Derick Roy Deeben 22 years 
130 W. Aspen Way, Salem, Utah 
Children ; 
Heather Lyn Deeben 2\ years 
Kevin Roy Deeben 4 months 
Procedures 
Clinical interviews with each subject 
Home visits with each party at their residence 
Observations of children in each residence 
(with exception of youngest not seen in father's home) 
Collateral contacts from references provided 
Purpose; 
Janette and Derick Deeben are ending a three year marriage 
at this time. They have two children as issue of this union and 
there has arisen some dispute as to which parent should have care 
and custody of the two children. The children are currently in 
the custody of the mother and the father has been exercising 
visitation rights. This evaluation and report is intending to 
investigate each of the parents circumstances and to render an 
opinion as to what custody arrangements are in the best interests 
of the children at this point. 
The mother - Janette Deeben: 
The mother is presently living with her parents, Mr. 
and Mrs. Guiver in Sunset, Ut.f with her two children. She is 
nursing the four month boy and also attending Weber State College 
where she is a few hours short of Junior status as an elementary 
education major. She is also working at NICE corp. as a telephone 
agent from ten to 30 hours per week. 
Janette's schedule is tight. She is taking nine hours 
of classes at her college which requires her to rise early to 
clothe and feed the children, nurse her son just before leaving, 
attend school from 8:30 am to 11:00 am, come home immediately to Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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nurse her son again and to attend to Heather's needs. From Ved. 
to Sat. Janette has been working at her employment with NICE from 
3 PM to 9 PM until recently when there have been fewer hours of 
work availible. During the above time care of the children is 
typically divided between Janette's younger sisters (ages 20 and 13) 
and the grandmother of the children, Mrs. Guiver. Sunday,, Monday 
and Tuesday the mother is with her children during the afternoon 
and evening. When none of the abovementioned, there are adult and 
teen age tenders readily availible for short periods. 
The Home: 
The Guiver home in Sunset is a four bedroom house in a 
pleasant and typical suburban middle class area. They have been 
in the same home for over 25 years. The home is clean and well 
kept. There is, however, at this time a problem with crowding. 
The twenty year old sister, Sheryl, was attending Utah State Univ-
ersity in Logan and she is temporarily home with her parents 
until she returns to Logan in January. Right now this forces 
Janette to room with her children in a converted playroom downstairs 
and the conditions are tolerable but less than ideal. It is 
assumed that with the sister moving back to college the space problem 
will be resolved. 
Finances are adequate at this time with the help of 
her parents who are helping with attorney fees and who do not 
charge her for rent and food. Otherwise she is able to pay her 
bills from her earnings. Janette is anxious to complete her 
education so that the financial pressure can be alleviated to a 
considerable degree. 
Mothers Concerns: 
Janette states that when Derick lived with her he was very 
seldom home with the children. He was rarely supportive of her, 
that is, helpful to her with the children when she could use it. 
She cited an example of having to cook while holding Heather on 
her hip and Derick ignoring her and Derick reading a magazine or 
watching TV. When someone else came around, then he would make a 
show of helping or playing with Heather. 
Janette states that Derick has an explosive temper that 
often erupted with her causing her to fear him. She is very doubtful 
that he will be able to hold his temper with Heather who is a child 
who will push the limits and be bullheaded. 
Finally, Janette has some real doubts that it will be 
he who will actually raise any children but really wind up in the 
hands of his mother. She does not express any fears for this 
situation assuming that the grandmother Deeben would care for 
children well but she feels that since she is the parent, and Derick 
is the parent, the choice should be with each of them. Given 
that choice, she points out that she has been in fact the major 
caretaker of the children up to now. 
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The Father - Derick Deeben: 
hardshft™ ^ ^ s c h ; Derick Deeben has been granted a n a nrp xrescnarge 
in order to deal with the pending divorce and what he considers are 
very serious concerns about how his wife can care for his two 
children. His present circumstance is similar to his wife's. He 
gives his address as being his parent's home but recently he took 
an apartment with other roommates and is helping to manage that 
complex as compensation in lieu of rent. When he has his daughter 
for the weekend Derick comes back to his parents home and he 
shares his room with the little girl there. 
If custody should be granted to him, Mr. Deeben would 
depend upon his mother and teen age sisters for providing care 
in the late afternoon and evening should he have to be working. 
THere are neighbors in the immediate vicinity who have expressed 
a keen interest in tending his children during the day when his 
sisters and mother are at school and work respectively. 
The Deeben family home has a partially finished basement 
which could easily be converted to a three room apartment for Derick 
and the children should he be granted custody. This would take about 
a month to complete. 
Mr. Deeben is also planning to attend school next term 
having been accepted to the Utah Community College (formerly the 
Utah Trade Tech) and will be working at least part time. 
The Home: 
The Deeben home is a five bedroom relatively new home 
in an upper middle class area of Salem, Ut, a community between 
Spanish Fork and Payson, a few miles south of Provo. It is clean, 
nicely decorated and comfortable. The Deebens have horses nearby 
that the children have access to. 
The finances of the situation with Derick are a bit unclear 
at this time, but while he acknowledges that his parents have been 
and will be assisting him for awhile, he intends to be self supporting 
as soon as possible. Derick has been able to find employment in 
the past with relative ease. 
The Fathers Concerns: 
Derick has several concerns that he feels will be of 
major importance in regards to Janette's ability to take care of 
the children. He cites at least two occasions where Janette made 
threats to kill herself, once before marriage and once during the 
marriage. He states that she is anorectic, doesn't eat properly 
and jeopardizes her health. 
Since separating, the father has had occasion to be 
very concerned with what seems to be overuse of Paragoric with 
the girl Heather, and possibly the infant boy, Kevin. 
Finally, the father cites the instance of bruising found 
on Heather's leg which according to how the girl tells it, was made Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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by a stick (a ram rod to a black poweder rifle) by her grand-
father Guiver • 
Derick also cites times when he found Heather unfed 
and unchanged and otherwise ill treated when he and Janette were 
together. 
Mr. Deeben feels that the motherfs instability and 
apparent neglect or abuse of Heather point to her inability 
to adequately care for his children. 
Observation of the Children: 
Heather was observed with her mother at the Guiver home 
in Sunset and she was observed at the Deeben home in Salem. 
Heather is a bright and active child who is greatly 
curious and quite willing to push the limits when she wants to 
do something. She is judged to be quite well developed mentally 
and physically. Her command of language is a bit ahead of most 
children her age. (This is probably due to the fact of having about 
six adults and four teen agers doting upon her) 
With the Deebens Heather was having a ball. Her young 
uncle and aunts were keeping her busy in active play. Heather 
also included the older folks (including the evaluator) in a game 
of catch with a basketball. 
With the Guivers (Janette's family), her play was more 
muted, matter of fact, and casual. She was, to this observer, 
entirely at home with everyone. She gave the impression of knowing 
exactly how she stood with each family member. This would be 
consistent with having lived with a situation on a daily basis fo^ 
several weeks. 
In sum, what was observed seemed to reflect differences 
in family styles but relationships and physical care in both homes 
seemed good. 
The infant boy, Kevin, was observed only in the motherfs 
residence due to his being nursed at this time. He gave every 
appearance of being a healthy, happy child and a very mellow baby. 
Collateral Contacts: 
Four references from each party's list were contacted 
by phone. The people contacted from each side were mostly 
neighbors who lived close by each home. The following information 
and impressions were gleaned from their comments: 
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Both families are well respected within their neighbor-
hoods. Observations of these people were that in each family 
the girl Heather was well taken care of and closely supervised 
at all times* 
Two of the collaterals contacted in behalf of Janette 
had her as a babysitter while she was in her teen years. They 
regarded her as an excellent child care provider, knowledgeable, 
active with the children under her care (she didn't just watch 
TV and talk on the phone.) 
Only one of the three references contacted in Derick's 
behalf could say that they had seen him on more than one or two 
occasions with his children. All had definite impressions of 
him as a very loving father highly concerned with his children's 
welfare. 
Not one of the individuals contacted had any doubts 
about the familys1 abilities to provide for the children. 
Other impressions included the apparent fact that 
practically no one in either family sincerely wanted this 
marriage to occur. The fact of Janette's pregnancy probably 
pushed things to marriage but it is this evaluator's opinion 
that their were a lot of unhappy people involved with this 
marriage and it probably should never have happened regardless. 
Another strong impression is the very different attitudes 
evident within each family system. This is not to say that either 
family was found to be lacking in any significant matter, but 
it very evident that each parent is the product of his and her 
family style and this probably feeds the tension that has always 
been felt between them. 
Analysis; 
1. Specific allegations concerning overuse of Paregoric 
with the children by Janette could not be corroborated. The 
medicine had been prescribed for a severe stomach flu by a Dr. 
White. Other bottles of the medication had been used by Mrs. 
Guiver for specific pain problems in the past. 
2. The bruising of the girls leg, frankly remains 
unaccounted for. If the grandfather had struck her, the girl 
certainly did not manifest any fear of him while the evaluator 
was in the home. The neighbors contacted indicated that Heather 
was very close to her grandfather and they even said she was 
virtually f,a shadow" to him. 
3. The infant, Kevin, being nursed and at this stage 
in his life, closely bonded to the mother should not, in any case, 
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be absent from the mother for any great length of time. He 
probably should be weaned to a bottle and solid food before 
going more than a day at a time with his father. 
4. It is apparent that Janette acted in ways that to 
the outside observer, would be considered to be disturbed while 
in her relationship with Derick. However, from what could be 
learned from others both before and after her involvement with 
Derick, this disturbance cannot be accounted for. It must be 
concluded therefore, that Janette's behavior was largely the 
product of the relationship. This is not to place blame upon 
her husband but only to point out that she was not prospering 
while being married for whatever reason. 
5. Derick apparently tried very hard to control 
what he perceived as his wife's aberrations. That he did so 
without adequate sensitivity to his wife's particular needs 
is probable. That he may have been a bit too forceful or 
insistent is possible. 
6. Inadequacies in parenting reported by either 
parent while living under the same roof could not be corroborated 
by direct observation or collateral report. 
7. Both parents intend 
toward the goal of obtaining good 
the needs of the children. . In ord 
depend upon their respective famil 
From this evaluator's reckoning of 
appears that Janette will do more 
Derick due to work and class sched 
the father's situation will requir 
sitters during day times because b 
and the brother and sister* will be 
situation is similar, use of baby 
often. 
to pursue training and education 
employment and providing for 
er to do this, both need to 
ies to a considerable degree. 
the present situation, it 
actual parenting than will 
ules. It also appears that 
e considerable use of baby 
oth grandparents are working 
in school. While Janette's 
sitters is not necessary as 
8. That the girl, Heather, thoroughly enjoys being 
with her Deeben family is evident. That she is also quite 
concerned about her mother's whereabouts was also observed. 
It is evident that this child can profit from both associations. 
Recommendations: 
If there were good communications between these two 
young parents, it would be the recommendation of this evaluator 
to work out a joint custody arrangement with the mother as primary 
custodian. However, this does not seem like a viable possibility. 
In comparing these two young parents and their families 
there could not be found much to differentiate between them. In 
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substance - providing for children's needs - they can both do 
very well. In style - an outgoing vs private "old fashioned 
approach to life - the children stand to learn a great deal as 
long as both families can respect the other's good intentions. 
It will be important to achieve a cooperative stance between 
the parents for the ultimate good of their children. The families 
should be supportive but definitely low key in influence. 
It is my recommendation that the best interests of the 
children of this marriage would be served by having care custody 
awarded to the mother, Janette Deeben. Liberal visitations with 
the father should be part of the decree. It is hoped that these 
two young people can see their way to cooperation while they 
both seek the training and education needed for their future lives 
rather than seek to find faults. They could be very helpful 
to each other at various times in the next few years. 
Respectfully, 
Steven L. Watson 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY 









Civil No. 40735 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on Tuesday, September 8, 1987, 
the above-entitled matter came on for HEARING in the Second 
Judicial District Court in and for Davis County, State of 
Utah, before the HONORABLE DOUGLAS L CORNAEY, Presiding. 
• * * * 
A P P E A R A N C E S : 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
ROBERT L. NEELEY 
Attorney at Law 
2485 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 
DALE E. STRATFORD 
Attorney at Law 
First Security Bank Bldg. 
Ogden, Utah 
Nancy H. Davis, C.S.R. 
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X T H E COURT: Janette Deeben versus Derick Deeben. 
2 MR. STRATFORD: If it please the Court, this matter 
3 is an appeal from the Commissioner and we prepared an order 
4 that has not been submitted to the Commissioner. I didn't 
5 know whether the Court wished this before these proceedings, 
Q but that has not been signed by the Commissioner, but was 
7 ! prepared. 
3 j THE COURT: How long do you anticipate it taking 
9 today? 
10 MR. STRATFORD: Pardon me? / 
11 THE COURT: How long? 
12 MR. NEELEY: I think we can do it by representation. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. So represent to me how long it's 
i 
14 going to be. 
151 MR. NEELEY: I would say three minutes on our part. 
16I THE COURT: Your part? 
17 MR. STRATFORD: Depends on what he says. 
18 THE COURT: That always depends on that. That's what 
19 makes it tough. 
20 MR. STRATFORD: I think we can submit most of this by 
21 stipulation. I believe, if it please the Court— 
22 THE COURT: Any that can't be submitted by 
23 stipulation? 
24 MR. STRATFORD: I think not. There may be one 
25 item that--I think this matter can be dealt with rather 
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summarily. 
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 
MR. NEELEY: Your Honor, there was a pretrial hearing 
in the above-entitled matter on the 12th of August of this 
year before Commissioner Richards and at that time he entered 
a recommendation. It's my understanding that in Davis County 
at a pretrial the Commissioner is to determine what the issues 
are and not make recommendations which become orders. The 
only way that affects this particular case is that at the time 
of the pretrial in August, Derick Deeben was enlisted in the 
United States Army, stationed in Texas. 
In paragraph 2, I think that is, in fact, reflected 
and it goes on to say that his visitation rights, which he 
would otherwise have shall be vested in his parents, the minor 
children's maternal grandparents. 
The issue that we had appealed had to do with the 
visitation rights granted to the maternal grandparents which, 
essentially, they wanted every other weekend from Friday at 
6:00 until Sunday at 6:00. 
THE COURT: I do gather that—is this Mr. Deeben 
here? 
MR. STRATFORD: Yes. He has since the hearing, he 
received a discharge from the military service. 
MR. NEELEY: Apparently, he arrived home taking a 
hardship from the Army sometime this weekend. So, it appears 
3 
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1 that the issue that we appealed is moot. The child in 
2 question is two and a half years of age. 
3 I THE COURT: Well, have you got all this solved or is 
4 this still just a pretrial? 
5 MR. NEELEY: Well, we are agreeing to every other 
6 weekend. 
7 MR. STRATFORD: Well, go ahead. 
8! MR. NEELEY: The only issue that we have is the issue 
9 of child support. He was ordered to pay $245— 
10 MR. STRATFORD: Eight dollars per child. 
11 MR. NEELEY: — t o the plaintiff in this matter. Now 
12 he has taken a hardship. I'm not quite sure what the hardship 
13 is. He has come back and basically said, I am unemployed and 
14! I don't have funds to pay for child support, but we agree that 
15 since he is back that he can have visitation every other 
16 weekend commencing this weekend, Friday at 6:00 until Sunday 
17 at 6:00 with the two and a half year old. The six or seven-
18 week old child, he can see when he comes to pick up his 
19 daughter on visitation. 
20 MR. STRATFORD: If it please the Court, I wish 
21 visitation was as simple as counsel states. Our problem, 
22 basically, is that we believe that the mother of the child and 
23 her family have determined that they are going to frustrate 
24 and interfere with visitation in any way possible and they had 
25 selected a time and the mother's family told him when the 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 














Deeben family can come to Layton to pick up the child. 
They arrived at the scheduled time and they have 
reason to believe that the family was in the home and would 
not answer the door. We believe that they will continue to 
frustrate and interfere with visitation. We would like 
visitation spelled out to be every other weekend and alternate 
holidays, if we may, until the matter can be heard on its 
merits which is set sometime in November and we would also ask 
the Court— 
THE COURT: It's set in November? 
MR. STRATFORD: I thought it was. 
THE COURT: Do we have a date? 
MR. NEELEY: I think it's November 6th, your Honor. 












THE COURT: What are the issues that are going to be 
tried, then? 
MR. STRATFORD: The issue—the primary issue will be 
that of child custody as to which of the two parents shall be 
entitled to custody of the children. 
THE COURT: It's set for a half a day trial; is that 
right? 
MR. STRATFORD: I don't know how the Commissioner set 
it. 
THE COURT: There's no question that he set it for a 
half a day trial and that's all that is available. That's 
5 
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why I am checking with both of you today. 
MR. STRATFORD: It may be. 
MR. NEELEY: That's my understanding that it's a half 
a day. I would anticipate longer than that, but I don't know. 
Part of it will be depending upon discovery. We also had 
difficulties. We asked the Commissioner to sign the order 
which is included in this order that we be allowed to have a 
home study made of the natural mother's home where she is now 
residing with her parents and we have not been able to have 
that home study conducted as of yet. 
THE COURT: Home study by who? 
MR. STRATFORD: The Court left that to our discretion 
as to which psychologist or— 
14| THE COURT: Usually, though, we don't want just a 











MR. STRATFORD: And we have no objection and the 
problem we had before that time while he was in the military 
made it a little more difficult and he has now been released 
from the military. Of course, he will be available for a home 
study and we have no problem with that. 
THE COURT: Well, do we need to change that trial 
date right now while it's still early? 
MR. STRATFORD: I would think we may. I think that 
home study is going to take longer than we anticipated. 
THE COURT: Well, normally you can get a home study 
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done in two months if you go to work right now. 
MR. STRATFORD: But we haven't had him here. 
THE COURT: Okay, but we got him here now and you 
still have two months. If I take it off the 9th and put it on 
the 13th, that's a full day. I only suggest this because if 
you show up for a half a day you won't get more than a half a 
day and if you are going to take more you might as well put it 
on the calendar that way. 
MR. STRATFORD: I would have no objection to the 
13th. I would prefer that so we can at least be heard. 
THE COURT: Is that agreeable to you? 
MR. NEELEY: That would be fine, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's put it on trial November 
13th. That's Friday and show that that is at 9:00 a.m. Now, 
go ahead with'your spelling out of the visitation. 
MR. STRATFORD: And visitation, the way the 
Commissioner spelled it out was that the Deeben's can arrive 
at 6:00 on Friday and then they would have 45 minutes with the 
baby and with Heather, the two and a half year old, now in the 
home of the natural mother, where they can visit with the 
children outside of any influence one way or another. 
Then the baby would be returned, I think his name is 
Kevin, would be returned to the home and they would then take 
Heather with them and they live in Salem, Utah. When they 
return between 6:00 on Sunday evening—they have the child 
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between 6:00 and 8:00 on Sunday evening returning"both 
children back to the home by 8:00 p.m. that evening. 
Deeben's do have relatives and have a home in the general 
vicinity so they can, in fact, accomplish that. 
We feel that they have attempted to frustrate that 
if at all possible and we would also like to have every other 
holiday included in the visitation rights which up to now we 
have not had. 
THE COURT: If you get it done, there probably won't 
be any holidays between it, but — 
MR. STRATFORD: Of any consequence, you may have 
Columbus Day. You may have Halloween. 
THE COURT: We don't call Halloween a holiday. The 
general ones that we are talking about are those standard 
state or national holidays that we include those in, which are 
eight or nine. I don't remember which. 
MR. STRATFORD: Utah used to have 12. Then the other 
issue is the child support. The Commissioner's order, after 
hearing circumstances of the parties, was that Mr. Deeben was 
to pay $80 per child per month while in the military service 
and the question of alimony was held in abeyance. Since his 
release from the service—he was injured and his occupation in 
the military is vehicle mechanic. Basically, he was a tank 
repairman and there isn't much call for tank repairmen, but at 
the present time he was injured in those field exercises and 
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he does have to undergo surgery. 
Ke has been released to the Veteran's Administration. 
His first appointment is in two weeks. 
MR. DEEBEN: Within three. Approximately two weeks. 
MR. STRATFORD: And at that time they will determine 
what kind of medical operation he must undergo. One of the 
reasons that he left the military was that the military 
8 j indicated to him that as a result of the surgery there was 
9 I probably a 50/50 chance by the time they got through that he 
10 would have permanent impairments in the knee. 
11 THE COURT: Permanent what? 
12 MR. STRATFORD: He would have loss of function in the 
13J knee. He said that under the circumstances I will try, but in 












He is seeking medical attention for the knee which 
will require an operation and so, we would ask the Court— 
THE COURT: That doesn't have any effect on income, 
does it? 
MR. STRATFORD: Well, it certainly does because when 
he left the military service—this is the other problem. He 
tells me that upon being released from the service he lost all 
benefits and pay. 
THE COURT: How do you lose that? Because he 
24 j voluntarily walked away? Is that what you mean? 
MR. STRATFORD: Because he took a hardship discharge 
9 
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1 rather than remain with the service to resolve this issue. As 
2 * understand it, they indicated to you that you had no more 
3 pay allotment or services from the military; is that correct? 
4 I MR. DEEBEN: That is correct, up until the time 
5 Veteran's Administration can put this before a board and 
g decide whether they will do a medical disability or whether 
7 they will just cover medical until the knee and injury is 
8 properly taken care of. 
9 MR. STRATFORD: And so, for that reason, we would ask 
10 the Court to allow us to at least use the Uniform Schedule, 
11 depending on what the wages are, based on the Uniform 
12 Schedule. I don't know if I can do any better than that. 
13 THE COURT: Well, I think what ought to be 
14i appropriate is that he ought to pay $80 per month per child. 
151 I think he ought to pay that unless he shows he can't afford 
15 it. Now, just because he gets out and can't afford it— 
171 normally I know that's not the way—if he was disabled in the 
18 service, I know that there's disability that is there and even 
191 if you say I take a hardship discharge, that doesn't relieve 
20 him of the responsibility already incurred—well, for medical 
21 and disability that results from it. 
22 So, I am going to leave it there on the assumption 
23 that he is going to be paid and he ought to contribute toward 
24 the support of his child. If it turns out to be otherwise we 
25 j will, of course, have to rethink it. 
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